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This thesis examines Germany’s role at the center of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). It explores German socio-economic policies and experiences in order to provide 
a more comprehensive understanding of why the EMU operates with German influence 
as well as in opposition to it. Historically, Germany’s economic experience, from the 
Weimar Republic to 2013, has been uniquely shaped by its population and the 
embeddedness of its market place. From this experience, Germany has erected certain 
elements of government protection forged by a century of civil protection. These 
experiences also shape Germany’s place in the Euro area as well as its policies toward the 
European economic crisis from 2007 through 2013. As of 2013, most Euro area members 
consider Germany as the economic backbone to the union, but rarely internalize 
Germany’s economic past. Therefore, an application of the development of the German 
social market bears considerable importance upon the future of the Euro area as well as 
the policies enacted within the union, which Germany seeks to shape. 
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The fate of Europe and its prosperity have long been an urgent security concern of 
the United States (U.S.). The crisis of the European common currency and the political 
efficacy of the European Union (EU) form a new chapter in the evolution of Europe from 
war to peace and now into a new crisis with security implications that cannot be ignored 
in a U.S. defense establishment focused on Asia. The European economic crisis—which 
began in 2007 and lingers into today—revealed that the currency union that underlies the 
European Union suffers from contradictions in need of serious consideration for 
restructuring and protection from shocks. The Euro area crisis highlighted particular 
weaknesses within the currency union to include undercapitalization of national banks, 
individual sovereign country debt burdens, and marginal economic growth.1 In the 
landscape of the Euro area, such nations as Holland, Germany and Austria have 
performed relatively well, but they too have encountered a crisis that calls into question 
past and current policy decisions. Once more the fortunes and power of Germany as the 
power of Europe have emerged as central to the fate of Europe and its prosperity and 
security. 
The research in this study will focus on the economic history of the Euro area, 
with a particular emphasis on the German role within it, as a means of understanding the 
roots of the current Euro crisis. Specifically, when compared to the European market the 
German market takes on both similar and divergent characteristics that formed the current 
paradigm. With regard to the foundations and sources of an economy in the social strata, 
the question of how does the German market and society differ from that of its European 
partners is pertinent to this research. Particular social protectionist measures in place in 
Germany, such as strong labor unions and universal banks, have delivered steady 
progress. Since 2000, Germany and Greece nearly sustained positive gross domestic 
product (GDP) annual growth rates every year until the financial crisis beginning in 
                                                 
1 Jay C. Shambaugh, Ricardo Reis, and Helene Rey, “The Euro’s Three Crises,” Brookings Institution, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012, 162–170.  
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2007.2 With Germany’s GDP annual growth slightly below two percent and Greece’s in 
excess of negative 7.5 percent in 2012, however, highlighted Germany’s ability to 
perform due to its innate economic strength through crisis. The main hypothesis 
underpinning this thesis is that the stark differences seen between countries in the Euro 
area, especially between Germany and Greece and Italy, results from the inherent 
differences in the banking practices of each country, which are in turn the product of each 
country’s socio-economic past.  
Now a member of a transnational economic union, how has Germany found its 
place as the backbone of the Euro area? Its place in the Euro area is unique, and a deeper 
understanding of how Germany achieved this is imperative. Also, Germany’s institutions 
are unique as well as a result of its economic and political history. How Germans have 
come to think about money and politics in specific ways as a result of depression and war 
has formed its trajectory within the European Union. In addition, the evolution and 
character of the state, economy and society in Central Europe and Southern Europe are 
essential elements to understand the present crisis in its detail. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF GERMANY WITHIN THE EURO AREA CRISIS 
On a global scale, the Euro area crisis has large-scale implications. Germany is 
the backbone of Europe, with its economic success being of great interest to it, its 
European neighbors, and the international community. In one sense, Germany is an 
integral part of the European economic system. Although Germany faces economic 
pitfalls, as described by Siebert, its ability to maintain its relative economic strength in 
Europe is paramount. Germany shares many of Europe’s economic condition, however, 
“the German illness cannot be characterized as a pan-European disease.”3 Therefore, a 
specific look at Germany’s economic history is necessary.  
                                                 
2 “Germany GDP Annual Growth Rate,” Trading Economics, Accessed November 5, 2013, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/germany/gdp-growth-annual. 
3 Martin Feldstein, “Germany’s Economic Ills,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/siebert.html. 
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Researching the causes and effects of the Euro area’s financial crisis has become 
increasingly important as the world becomes more interconnected economically and 
socially. The current European malaise poses a challenge to theorists who believe that a 
globalized world results in prosperity. An alternative vantage point could reveal evidence 
that does not support this theory. A truly globalized world is one of international market 
interconnectedness and could mean the possible breakdown of local or regional social 
distinction, such as nation-states or certain ethnicities. This research does not suggest that 
the globalized world has truly taken form, or will, in Europe. In fact, the regional 
differences within Europe could explain the differing economic problems that face each 
country. The Euro area is made up of countries with individual unique institutions, with 
differing political–economic situations. Hence, although the Euro area provides a 
transnational umbrella that can lead to prosperity, each country brings its own problems 
and benefits to the common market. In looking at the embedded nature of economics in 
societal institutions, a greater grasp of the economic collapse could be achieved, which 
could force political-economists to reevaluate policy decisions in future situations. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Through a historical lens, a comparative analysis of the Weimar Republic and 
current Germany sheds light upon political and economic decisions that have affected not 
only Germany but also the entire European economic union. In researching the causes 
and effects of economic and political decisions of German elites through history, it is 
important to understand no single element was at the core of any economic crisis 
discussed in this research; yet certain historical patterns are relevant to the current crisis. 
The research will pursue the following hypotheses and lines of inquiry.  
First, the Weimar Republic presents a historical case study with many parallels to 
the more contemporary German social and economic situation. A guiding hypothesis of 
this work is that Germany’s economic history sheds a great deal of light on the causes 
and effects of current German economic practices. The complexity of the economic crisis 
in Europe certainly requires more than a simple prescription. Yet a thorough analysis that 
weighs not only economic and political issues, but also examines the social dynamic 
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underpinning political-economic choices is necessary. The economic story of the Weimar 
Republic presents differing aspects to the current Euro area crisis, but certainly contains 
similar aspects as well.  
Second, a retelling of Germany’s economic history can help to correct common 
inaccuracies that policy makers abroad continue to maintain. Chronologically, from the 
Weimar Republic’s economic crisis compounded by its vast war reparations to the rise in 
cartels and worker’s leverage, a misreading of this history exists. A pendulum exists as 
well, and Karl Polanyi explained it to be one that swings from market forces to societal 
pushback. When society can no longer tolerate the rate of change and social dislocation 
imposed by the forces of the market it insists on protection, often in the form of 
government intervention in the market.4 In the throes of war, German society endured 
difficult social and economic circumstances, which explains its government’s policy 
decisions to erect institutions that protect its society. A core hypothesis motivating this 
study is that German policy decisions can be seen as having constructed a form of 
capitalism effectively tailored to German society, which can be contrasted to Anglo-
Saxon capitalism. Moreover, among the differing forms of worldwide capitalism, and 
despite the heavy hand that the United States played in Germany’s modern history, the 
German social market is inherently different from its Western capitalist counterparts. The 
evidence remains with Germany’s cartel past, a divided country from hot wars to the 
Cold War, and the social market’s unique makeup of industry, labor, and government. 
Lastly, despite Germany’s economic emergency, its economy is strong enough to 
weather the storm and maintain its prominence within the economic union as well as 
internationally. The hypothesis here is that Germany has continued to pursue economic 
policy geared toward a greater Europe while giving up sovereignty amidst battling 
individual sovereign ideals. Siebert wrote, “This trend is manifest in many policy areas, 
including monetary policy, subsidy control, and a large number of the regulations in the 
                                                 
4 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001), 138. 
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product market, the environmental arena, and the capital market.”5 In exploring this 
hypothesis, this thesis will ask the question, what European-wide policy decisions mirror 




















                                                 
5 Horst Siebert, The German Economy: Beyond the Social Market (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 292. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to organize the historical information pertaining to Germany’s economic 
history from the Weimar Republic to today, a framework must be established that 
highlights past and present studies of the subject. The following framework follows a 
chronological retelling of German economic history and establishes the recognized 
literature in this field. This literature review will establish essential themes in each era 
that, along a linear axis, fall between the two extremes of a central government controlled 
economy and one that is completely liberalized and free from government intervention. 
Therefore, along this linear axis, Germany ebbed and flowed from either extreme, but 
leaned toward the side of government intervention driven by protectionist measures 
versus an economic system completely free of government control. The review thus 
provides the necessary foundation for explaining the German socio-economic trajectory, 
and more importantly understanding the broader EU implications of German influence. 
This historical understanding of the development of the social market will in turn deliver 
a comprehensive study of the Euro area economic crisis through the lens of the German 
politician, employer, and laborer. 
Generally, theoretical discussion on economic policy can be arrayed along a 
spectrum with two differing camps at the extremes of the framework. To the left are the 
proponents of government intervention to the extremes of Karl Marx, who preached a 
centrally planned state as a necessary step toward the communist utopia. To the right are 
those who believe in no government intervention in economic policy, and a state that 
only provides the infrastructure for the market to grow in the anarchic system, such as 
Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek. This research will fall somewhere in between and 
explain Germany’s economic history along the lines of Karl Polanyi, who suggested that 
a double movement exists that explains the dialectical nature of society and economic 
policy through history. 
Polanyi explained the political and economic influences that created The Great 
War and the policies that ensued in the interwar period. Because economic institutions 
are embedded in society, Polanyi emphasized the increasing importance of national 
 8
currencies within the international system. Polanyi wrote, “Internally and externally 
alike, dwindling currencies spelled disruption.”6 Furthermore, he rationalized that 
economic and political policies, due to their inherent interoperability, valued the social 
worth placed in the gold standard adhered to by many European countries and America, 
because of its tangibility. Great Britain, America, and France attempted to keep their 
currencies relevant to one another so to stave off inflation. Yet, Polanyi explained, 
“When the usual swing of the pendulum after seven years of prosperity brought the long 
overdue slump in 1929, matters were immeasurably aggravated by the existing state of 
cryptoinflation.”7 Polanyi questioned the sole adherence to the market system, but did not 
advocate a strict planned economic system. In the case of Weimar Germany, Polanyi 
wrote, “Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such 
an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and 
natural substance of society.”8 Again, the dialectical nature of society and economics 
determined the Weimar Republic’s history. Because society and the market act 
dialectically related to one another, the different social, economic, and political 
challenges that are specific to each country’s circumstances create unique forms of 
capitalism. With varying societies and economic needs, an understanding that “A market 
economy must comprise all elements of industry, including labor, land, and money,” is 
essential.9 This literature review chronologically highlights core economic themes in 
contemporary German history and then turns more specifically to the European Union 
and its current financial crisis. 
A. GERMAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
Hardach portrayed a disgruntled German people during the Weimar years.10 From 
the burden of reparations from World War I to deflation policy, the German government 
                                                 
6 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 25. 
7 Ibid.,27. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 Ibid., 74. 
10 Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century (Berkely: University of 
California Press, 1980) 
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under Heinrich Brüning was in the midst of a policy struggle to manage the financial 
security of its people and government. In hopes of promoting a stronger export base to 
strengthen Germany’s economic presence, Brüning was forced to pursue an economic 
policy of deflation in order to remain relevant in the world economy, and not fall into 
“national isolation by means of reflationary measures.”11 Under Kurt von Schleicher, the 
German government focused on job creation and managed to have the Reichsbank fund 
much of the new policy.12 The Schleicher government left office and Adolf Hitler’s 
government moved in under the theme, “individual activity must never clash with the 
interests of the community, but must be carried out within the collective framework for 
the good of all.”13  
Wasserstein explained that there was no single cause of the Wall Street crash in 
the early 1930s. Indeed, the author singled out that “the return to the gold standard by 
Britain and most other major industrial powers” was a primary cause, but there were 
many others.14 Much like the Great War, a single element cannot explain why the crash 
occurred, but Wasserstein included war reparations, the changes contained in the 
modernizing of industry, unemployment, and “weakness in the international monetary 
system and in the banking systems of Germany, Austria, and Hungary.”15 The weakened 
German economy fueled international speculation, which damaged its reputation and 
investment future. Like Karl Hardach, Wasserstein detailed Chancellor Bruning’s 
deflationary policies that “raised taxes and introduced drastic cuts in government 
expenditure.”16 These tactics only worsened the economic situation and, in order to keep 
capital within Germany, banks had to limit transaction amounts, and Germans were 
unable to travel outside of the country.17 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 44–45. 
12 Ibid., 48. 
13 Ibid., 53. 
14 Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 165–166. 
15 Ibid., 166. 
16 Ibid., 167. 
17 Ibid., 167. 
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Braun described a vibrant German economy after World War II. With strong 
growth stemming from its export business, Germany faced the problem of large cash 
inflows that threatened another inflation crisis. Although still very high, “The slower 
growth in the 1960s was mainly caused by a lower elasticity of the labour supply.”18 The 
large labor supply transformed as workers aged and new ones encountered longer 
education cycles. The result of the declining labor force was an inflow of labor from 
Italy, Greece, and Spain.19 Yet, Germany’s relatively strong growth can be attributed to 
the strong social dynamic of a German generation that witnessed depression and war in a 
condensed timeline. German growth was unique in that it capitalized on its current 
situation, and enabled an economic apparatus capable of leading through exports. 
Moreover, the short term growth experienced in the 1950s can be attributed to 
“Industry[‘s] react[ion] to this by introducing capital-intensive methods of production 
which increased output significantly.”20 Certainly, the element of export led growth 
became a uniquely German experience and brought about relative short-term growth, but 
how the desired long-term growth would be achieved came into question.  
Braun explained, furthermore, based on the experience of the unequal distribution 
of wealth and the belief that the failure was in private capitalism, German policy makers 
of the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats advocated, “that the nationalism of 
key economic sectors would be more conducive to general welfare.”21 Simply, strong 
distrust of liberal or neoclassical economic policy makers grew. Although skeptical, 
Social Democrats and Christian Democrats valued the market system’s method as 
necessary for growth that a planned economy could not produce. Braun’s description of a 
third way, one that protected the social dynamic of socialism and greeted the growth 
brought by the market, laid the foundation for the modern German social economic state. 
Protections were placed on the Mittelstand in order to fuel small and medium sized 
                                                 
18 H.J. Braun, German Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1990), 168. 
19 Ibid., 169. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 176. 
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business growth. In the market, a banning of cartels ensued, except in “agriculture, 
housing, transportation, banking, and insurance.”22  
Sherman offered an account of the complex social, economic, and political issues 
posed the cusp of re-privatization upon German unification. Re-unification with East 
Germany brought about difficult social and economic repercussions—included 
differences in wages and living standards—that liberals believed could be answered by a 
freer market. The author detailed that East German living standards were high in 
comparison to other eastern bloc countries, but were still lower than West Germany’s.23 
In the midst of unification, the currency disparity between East and West Germany 
exacerbated the social factors of a common German people.24 Moreover, upon unification 
came the currency adjustment period that drastically affected employment and standards 
of living through unified Germany. The currency adjustments offered by West Germany 
was one of many attempts to “soften the impact of ‘creative destruction’ on the 
population and to bridge financing for those firms which—after reorientation—may stay 
in business.”25 Sherman’s work blended the social responses well against the fiscal 
measures taken by policy makers, and displayed the dialectical nature between the two.  
B. GERMANY IN THE CREATION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY UNION 
The creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was not a 
simple task for Germany, but Mertes argued that it was Helmut Kohl who understood the 
lasting implications of a common currency.26 On an economic basis the Mark was strong, 
and Germans found it difficult to share a currency with neighboring countries. Mertes 
made a socio-political argument for Germany’s place of power and said, “[Kohl] 
personified predictability and reliability, which was good for Germany, a country that 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 180. 
23 Heidemarie C. Sherman, German Unification and the International Economy, eds Leonard 
Waverman and Bernard Heitger (Florence: Routledge, 1993), 5. 
24 Ibid., 7. 
25 Ibid., 17. 
26 Michael Mertes, “Helmut Kohl’s Legacy for Germany,” The Washington Quarterly, vol 25, no 4, 
Autumn 2002, 68. 
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more than any other in Europe depends on its neighbors’ trust.”27 In German society 
Kohl was regarded with high esteem because he lowered inflation and created 2.2 million 
jobs between 1986 and 1990.28 Even with the currency crisis during reunification in 
recent memory, Germany was the economic hegemon during the inception of the EMU in 
1999. 
Empirical evidence and policy decisions developed Germany’s powerful position 
within the EMU. In his retelling of Euro’s first decade, Dyson portrayed a skeptical 
Germany concerned “about whether the conditions for a ‘stable’ and ‘strong’ [E]uro were 
secure.”29 The author depicted a strong Germany that accounted for “27.5 per cent of 
total Euro Area GDP and 37.25 per cent of external trade in goods in 2006.”30 
Furthermore, Dyson placed heavy emphasis on Germany’s role in the creation of the 
EMU and its insistence on a rules based approach.31 Yet, the author revealed a paradox of 
power created in the Bundesbank’s new role. On one hand the bank lost its reason for 
being, but on the other it allowed German methods and ideals to be reflected in the newly 
created EMU.32 The first decade of the Euro did not provide Germany with the 
overwhelming economic power that it wished for, but it allowed for strong years, such as 
2003 to 2005, to develop. The strong years of the common Euro currency has given 
Germany leverage among its economic partners.  
Siebert delivered a vivid account of Germany’s economic progression in the years 
leading up to the Euro area financial crisis of 2007. Published in 2005, Siebert’s 
explanation was apt in highlighting that “Germany has an institutional incentive system 
that has caused unemployment to ratchet upward in each recession, and negative 
economic shocks to last longer and be more severe each time.”33 Although Siebert argued 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 69. 
28 Ibid., 73. 
29 Kenneth Dyson, Euro at Ten: Europeanization, Power, and Convergence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 132. 
30 Ibid., 133.  
31 Ibid., 136. 
32 Ibid., 139. 
33 Siebert, The German Economy, 377. 
 13
for a realignment of Germany’s social policies, he did not believe that government 
intervention would solve economic crisis. Unlike the traditional economic thought of 
Germany, Siebert aligns more appropriately with Adam Smith in his interpretation of 
how the state must interact with the entrepreneur. Siebert’s thesis is that “[Germany’s] 
policy failures are linked to the priority that has been given to social protection and 
equity.”34 His thesis meshes with Wasserstein’s interpretation of the Weimar Republic’s 
economic crisis because of the overburden created by large social welfare programs. His 
neo-classical interpretation of the ensuing economic crisis placed blame upon Germany’s 
restrained market economy that habitually sought government intervention instead of 
market self-correction, and that an “institutional big bang” must occur to lift Germany out 
of doomed recession. 
C. THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKS AS AN IMPORTANT 
INSTITUTION DURING RECESSION 
The European Central Bank (ECB) wields monetary authority throughout Europe 
and much of the power derives from its ability to print money. The ECB is truly unique 
since its purview spans seventeen sovereign countries and its policies therefore take on a 
transnational effect. The Bank’s policies are of interest in that they are a manifestation of 
the greater European past—and, in particularly, salient ways the German past. Of course, 
at the forefront is the central challenge of managing the weaker countries’ debt, but the 
overall management of common currency members also brings about complex issues. For 
instance, if the fledgling nations request a bailout, a portion of their particular sovereignty 
can be, in essence, transferred to the ECB.35 
How the theorized, or realized, transfer of sovereignty is recognized is debatable, 
but the ECB’s hold on Eurozone members is a reality. In relation to Germany, the ECB’s 
methods could be interpreted as a reflection of the German economic past dating to the 
Weimar Republic. From the German Bundesbank’s perspective, it is public debt that has 
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the potential to spark inflation, and keeping austere measures stringently in place is what 
curbs the inflation scare.36 The ECB’s mission, similarly, is as the maintenance of price 
stability. Therefore, “The Governing Council has also clarified that, in the pursuit of price 
stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium 
term.”37 The congruence in policy between the ECB and Germany is evident, but must be 
drawn out through comparison and through history. Simply, with Germany’s growing 
share of influence within the ECB, and the commonalities witnessed through the 
evolution of ECB policy, one could point to the two bouts of inflation within Germany 
during the Weimar Republic as the impetus of the ECB’s willingness to learn from the 
German lessons and from it form future policy. 
D. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Jay C. Shambaugh et al. explained three central and inter-related causes of the 
Euro area’s financial crisis. First, in a comparison to American firms, Shambaugh 
clarified that European firms “rely more on the banking system for financing,” which in 
turn places heavy emphasis upon the banks and develops a potential single point of 
failure.38 Within this structure, problems of solvency and liquidity arise.39 Second, due to 
the heavy emphasis placed on individual country’s sovereign debt markets, investors 
were forced to understand, under one currency, the varying degrees of the debt-to-gross 
domestic product that each country was willing to accrue.40 Lastly, a growth crisis is 
developing into two distinct forms. Due to slow growth across the Euro area, 
unemployment and debt are inhibiting expeditious growth, and the Euro area’s growth is 
uneven.41  
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In the same neo-classical vein of Horst Siebert, Martin Feldstein of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research published, “Germany’s Economic Ills,” in 2002. At the 
time of writing, Feldstein portrayed a Germany with slowing growth in comparison to its 
Euro area partners with only a 0.3 percent increase.42 The author described the German 
government’s predilection for economic regulation and tax hikes among “a weakening of 
the educational system, and the hardening of labor market rigidities.”43 Feldstein detailed 
a more complex problem that emphasized the complications of Germany’s tie to the 
Euro, which routinely placed restrictions on Germany’s economic independence with 
broad sweeping Euro area policies. The crux of the argument relied upon the ability, or 
inability, of individual countries within the Euro area to handle their debt in unique ways. 
Another element that compounds Germany’s economic growth problem was the rigidity 
of employment and the rise of technology. Simply, firms were unwilling to replace 
employees with the new technological advances available to them.44 Another drag on the 
economy was the inability of the German government to afford the growing population of 
ageing people in need of health care and social security benefits.45 Much like Siebert, 
Feldstein attributed these factors to the decline in Germany’s growth and entrepreneur’s 
decisions to take risks in search of larger gains.46 
The network of relationships that perpetuate the Euro area is distinct from those 
underpinning other regional intergovernmental organizations (IGO) found around the 
world. And, although similarities exist between it and the United States, the makeup of 
the two is extremely different and requires different analyses. Unlike the individual states 
that makeup the United States, the countries of the Euro area are sovereign countries, 
each with their own socio-political-economic agenda. Although, the issues of the 
common currency union are transnational in nature, much of the economic union’s 
infrastructure can be attributed to Germany’s economic history and its influence upon the 
                                                 






continent. It is from the German perspective where an understanding can be developed of 
how the Euro area was created as well as the evolution of the ensuing sovereign debt 
crisis. In respect to Germany, it is evident that how each country individually manages 
these issues, as well as domestic issues, remains difficult. As the market and society 
catches up to the quickening pace of technology, one witnesses the adverse reactions it 
creates—as Polanyi explained in The Great Transformation. 
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III. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC AND WORLD WAR II  
GERMANY (1918-1945) 
After World War I the Weimar Republic represented a new dawn for Germany 
through democracy and new governance. Yet, the Weimar Republic’s bright future was 
overshadowed by the Allies’ demands upon a weakened German nation, economy and 
society. The epoch from 1918 to 1933 represented a time of German socio-economic 
growth and collapse, through the growth of labor and union relations, and a nation under 
inescapable outside pressure. From the Versailles Treaty to the rise of the Nazi party, this 
time in history offers a glimpse into the makings of today’s German social market, and 
provides salient aspects of cause and effect as found in the current German economy. 
Therefore, this chapter will trace the evolution of the German economy through 
the Weimar Republic’s era in history. The natural seesawing of economic policy will be 
drawn out and understood as Germany managed the Allies’ and its society’s expectations 
simultaneously, balancing demands for a laissez-faire economic system with protections 
and adjustments for German labor and capital. In particular, the double encounters with 
hyperinflation will form the majority of the argument’s premise that extreme economic 
conditions fostered the German national sense of the necessity of effective government 
intervention in economic matters. Moreover, the Weimar Republic’s rationale for 
intervention was based upon the history of social suffering through each crisis. The 
analysis continues through the Nazi government’s reign, but takes on a new element for 
this epoch. Initially, Hitler managed to reduce the German people’s fear of inflation and 
economic stagnation through intense government restructuring oriented toward a war 
economy. Finally, the result of World War II and Germany’s economic devastation 
provide the foundation for the social market to take form in the post war years.  
Karl Hardach divided up the interwar years of the Weimar Republic into three 
parts; the years directly after World War I with the inflation, the middle stable years, and 
the final years of the world depression with the death of democracy and the rise of 
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National Socialism.47 The first Republic, created in the course of late 1918 and early 
1919 at Weimar was dealt a heavy blow by the Versailles Treaty to the young democracy 
and its economy. The Versailles Treaty resulted in “the loss of 13 percent of Germany’s 
prewar territory, 10 percent of the population, 15 percent of the arable land, and 75 
percent of the iron ore deposits, as well as reduction of pig iron production capacity by 44 
percent, of steel by 38 percent, and of coal by 26 percent.”48 The victors wanted to 
deprive the nation of its war making potential, by reordering of Germany’s borders in a 
smaller space, which disrupted critical lines of communication, coupled with the 
enormous reparation payments incurred which stretched out without limit for decades 
ahead. Also, the Versailles Treaty dealt a hurtful and embarrassing blow with the “‘war 
guilt’ clause, which blamed Germany for starting the war.”49 
As war often does, World War I repurposed much of the German economy, and 
created an economic system capable of aligning with the needs of the state. During the 
period of 1914 to 1918, Germany committed to fulfilling its wartime needs, which 
included, in a strictly capitalist sense, an artificial realignment of industry. Yet, as the 
need for production increased the industrial worker did not necessarily become a mere 
cog in the machine with little representation. In fact, the Auxiliary Service Law “forced 
employers to recognize worker representation in those factories. It introduced collective 
bargaining and affirmed union’s right to organize.”50 Moreover, its creation minimized 
the amount of labor strikes.51 This recognition did not come easily, and many employers 
pushed back against the state’s labor-worker agreements.52 Later, the Ruhr Lockout in 
1928, whereby employers locked workers out of industrial shops in protest to high wages, 
demonstrated the socio-economic ramifications of collective bargaining agreements 
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previously made.53 Despite the resistance from the employers, collective bargaining 
between labor and industry resulted in a greater say for the former laying the basis for 
one of the major contemporary features of the German economic system. The period 
between 1913 and 1929 included a large increase in actual agreements made, and in some 
areas reaching 66 times the amount concluded prior to 1913.54  
Despite the leaps made by labor in the form of collective bargaining and the 
resuscitation of the German industrial base, the war placed a toll on the Republic. The 
war required the willingness of large businesses to cooperate in the effort—which, in 
turn, meant that small and medium sized businesses could not compete against the larger 
and more government-market oriented businesses. During the war, German capitalism 
faced pressure from large business as well as from the growing demands of labor and 
unions, which exacerbated the growing condition of inflation and Allied blockades 
against Germany.55 As the war progressed it became apparent that “This was a war in 
which, in the end, access to raw materials and production capacity were the keys to 
victory.”56 Therefore, it is no surprise that Germany’s war effort spending rose to half of 
the country’s total spending. 57 Allied demands in the armistice, signed on November 11, 
1918, that the German army return from its furthest reaches, diminish its navy to be 
diminished, and forfeit scores of weapons as the blockade continued thus resulted in a 
severe economic contraction.58  
The social situation prior to the outbreak of war is crucial to understanding the 
character of the war and economy and the shape of the peace. Immediately preceding 
World War I, elite decision makers in the Kaiser’s cabinet and middle class society had 
loathed the advent of a socialist state with plans of widespread nationalization of 
industry. As the debate of a socialist agenda versus a liberal-capitalist one ensued, those 
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calling for the nationalization of German industry “proved too timid to consolidate their 
gains, and the capitalists proved more resilient than they had initially appeared.”59 
Nonetheless, the military industrial dictatorship of wartime did much to realize a state-
centric practice within the German economy, in which the army and socialists cooperated 
as much as they leered at each other from their ideological barricades prior to 1914.  
In late 1918, early in the Weimar Republic’s existence, industry operated without 
fear of government takeover. William C. McNeil detailed the heavy hand that German 
capital shortages played in the Republic’s years in government. The period of inflation 
from 1923 to 1924 will highlight the importance of the Weimar Republic’s ability to 
operate and flesh out policies to absorb financial shock, as well as rethink the 
government’s role in economics. Also, McNeil’s account “explore[d] the role of the 
Dawes Plan in resolving the conflicts between German foreign and domestic policies.”60 
This chapter will outline the Weimar Republic’s economy and state through the lens of 
Hardach’s three periods, as well as analyze the policies put in place. This experience is 
essential for any sensible understanding of the political economy of Germany and the role 
of the past and its signal events as a guide in the present. Such knowledge hardly exists in 
the present among those outside of Germany who routinely fail to understand the sources 
of cause and effect in the past and present.  
A. BEGINNING OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC—1918 TO 1923—THE 
FIRST TRIMESTER 
The new republic emerged in the defeat of the fall of 1918 with a veil of shame 
that betrayed the existence of enduring sources of strength in the German economy amid 
intense political and social conflict at home and around Germany. The endurance of old 
elites, the first attempts by the republic to find its way, war guilt and the reparations issue 
framed the early years of the new republic and damaged the international political 
economy in which Germany existed, a fact that applied generally in central Europe, if not 
Europe as whole. Reparations had been central to the Franco-German enmity in the 19th 
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century, with the Reich placing a huge burden on a defeated France, which nonetheless 
paid off its debt. This memory operated at Versailles, where victors did all they could to 
break German power.  
The reparations burden placed on Germany is usually cited as 132 billion gold 
marks but Sally Marks believes it was only 50 billion gold marks.61 She attributes her 
findings to the fact that Germany “had an excellent propaganda position and made the 
most of it, leading the English-speaking world to believe that the reparations burden was 
both outrageous and unpayable.”62 Reparations took many forms, and Germany found 
itself in a position paying a war debt and benefits to veterans as well. 63 The reparations 
demanded of Germany after World War I had a compounding effect upon its economy. 
Germany’s balance of payments deficit exaggerated inflation, and “rais[ed] the cost of 
imports and consequently the cost of production.”64 As the reparations remained unpaid, 
the credit line of the German government diminished, and inflation devalued German 
money so much that payments became nearly impossible. To put the inflation crisis of 
1923 in perspective, it took 1,542 German Marks to buy a single United States Dollar in 
January of 1920.65 By November 1923, one U.S. dollar could purchase 219 trillion 
Marks.66 Perhaps more staggering, “Wholesale prices increased from 57% change in May 
to a 29,586% change in October of the same year, while the exchange rate increased from 
a 95% change in May to a 25,957% change in October.”67 
The growing rate of inflation of the German Mark affected the beleaguered 
German people as well as outsiders. Hardach wrote, “most of the time the external value 
of the mark fell faster than internal prices,” which created an interesting situation for 
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foreigners purchasing Marks.68 For Germans inside of Germany, the rising rate of 
inflation made it possible for investors to profit, and enabled investors from abroad to 
profit greatly in various areas. A bank borrower could make a large amount of money 
since what was originally taken out decreased in value, making it easier to pay; indeed, 
“the Reich, was thus able to pay off its internal war debts with ease.”69 Such was, after 
all, the goal of the policy of inflation to eradicate such debts. Outsiders used the same 
method since their ability to payoff German loans was made easier as time continued and 
inflation rose.  
For the German citizen, especially the member of the middle class for whom thrift 
and other such virtues were ingrained in culture and society for centuries prior, inflation 
raised the prices of goods drastically. Moreover, the rate of inflation grew at such a fast 
pace that the actual printing of money could not keep up. This fact meant that wages, 
market sales, and other transactions suffered due to a lack of physical currency. Since it 
cost so much money to purchase an item or pay a laborer, the requisite currency had to be 
available for distribution. In effect, the Mark became useless, and the German citizen had 
to come to grips with its depleted value. With a devalued Mark and lack of physical 
currency, the German market came to a halt causing food shortages.70  
Ultimately, Hardach attributed Germany’s period of hyperinflation in 1923 to the 
enormous war reparation payments demanded by the Allies as well as the inflation that 
had begun in wartime. The aforementioned figure of 132 billion gold marks “bore no 
relation to the claims originally presented by the victor states, but was simply the one the 
Allies could agree upon in view of inter-Allied debts.”71 France was to receive the largest 
percentage of the reparations payments, but by 1922 it became a reality that Germany 
was incapable of paying the Allies agreed upon payment scheme.72 Also, the large sum 
of payments required Germany to seek creative solutions, which resulted in the 
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borrowing of money from the Reichsbank instead of levying taxes form its citizenry. 
Paradoxically, issues arose when Germany made good on its war debt through the 
transfer of duty free exports. Since countries such as France and Great Britain were 
industrial equals to Germany, as Germans introduced their products into the Allies’ 
market unwanted competition ensued.73 This problem opened a greater role for the 
United States and ushered in, despite crisis, a period of stabilization that itself was at risk 
in the further evolution of the German republic.  
B. THE MIDDLE YEARS OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC—THE SECOND 
TRIMESTER: 1924–1928/9.  
The unsolved issues of inflation and the failure to resolve the outstanding war 
reparations inhibited Germany from paying France what it was due under the Treaty of 
Versailles. In response to Germany’s inability, or lack of interest, to pay France, “French 
Premier Raymond Poincare decided on another method of solving the issue and sent 
French troops into Germany’s industrial Ruhr River Basin in January 1923 to force 
Germany to meets its obligations under the treaty of Versailles.”74 After continued 
stalemate between France and Germany, the United States sent an unofficial committee 
to investigate what was necessary to enhance Germany’s economic stability.75 While the 
Americans had grown increasingly wary of French policy in Germany, they had 
withdrawn their troops in 1922, but believed, wrongly as it turned out, that American 
financial power was sufficient to manage central Europe without security guarantees in 
the League or in a real role for the U.S. on the continent.  
Named after Charles G. Dawes, the committee consisted of American 
businessmen, and its creation sparked separate discussions of its intent inside and outside 
of Germany. American examples of economy and society had become models for many 
in Germany in the 1920s, when U.S. commercial activities in Europe took off in the wake 
of the war. Skeptics worried that the Americans wanted to secure a political victory 
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before the elections of 1924 kicked off, and worried little about what truly became 
Germany’s economic future. The plan created, after the committee’s deliberations from 
January to April of 1924, appeared to be unfeasible in practice, and it attempted to 
distribute to the Allies every Mark available without harming Germany’s economic 
security. By creation, the plan called for Germany to pay 2.5 billion RM per year if it 
were economically feasible. If these conditions could not be met, Germany would pay 
what it could so that its financial integrity remained intact.76 In practice, taxes to fund 
reparations payments came from “a transportation tax on the Reichsbahn (the national 
railroad), and the interest payments on newly created mortgages of the Reichsbahn and of 
all large industrial enterprises.”77 Additionally, the Reichsbank removed itself from 
government control, and Germany raised taxes that would fund a budget surplus. Without 
the Reichsbank as sole creditor to the German financial institution, and a newly 
established tax income, Germany could make financial strides toward paying its war 
reparations debt. 
Among German financiers, the Dawes Plan suggested an un-payable war debt, 
and was a plan that would never be fulfilled. Despite a generally unwilling German 
population, Karl Ritter of the Foreign Ministry “argued that in the short run, the plan 
offered the best chance for German economic recovery…But he believed that this growth 
would probably not be sufficient to permit transfer of the full 2.5 billion marks.”78 The 
Plan called for a loan to propel the German economy into economic prosperity, and the 
United States provided the bulk of a German stimulation loan with 400 million RM.79 
The Dawes Plan consisted of two important aspects, both of which are particularly salient 
in respect to today’s European economy. Tangibly, Germany issued bonds at 1,027 
billion RM and at such a high rate that they became oversubscribed.80 The large sale of 
German bonds drove the market price higher, which enabled investors to sell them at 
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profitable prices. 81 In addition, the United States’ monetary backing of the Dawes Plan 
represented solidarity between the Americans and Germans, which helped foster a strong 
German market.82 
Ultimately, from the creation of the Dawes Plan to the issuance of the Dawes loan 
on October 10, 1924,83 the Plan spanned across the first and second trimesters of the 
Weimar Republic’s existence. Hardach titled the first period of the Weimar Republic as 
“the chaotic times of inflation and Excessive Reparation Demands,”84 and the second 
trimester as “The Stabilization and Prosperity Period.”85 Certainly, the Dawes Plan 
addressed the overwhelming issue of German market insecurity fueled by inflation and 
reparations. The years of prosperity to follow, from 1923 to 1929, validated much of the 
Dawes Plan, “so well, in fact, that the statesmen of the creditor nations advocated a 
permanent and final settlement in place of [the] transitional arrangement.”86 In the eyes 
of German nationalists and enemies of the Versailles and Weimar system, this U.S. 
intrusion into the life and economy of the nation represented an outrage and a trespass on 
sovereignty the echoes of which contrast with the international political economy of the 
post 1945 regime and also casts a light on the most recent phase in the evolution of the 
German economy and its place in Europe and the wider world.  
The Dawes Plan minimized the negative effects of inflation in the German 
economy, and spurred important reforms of state and economy within the German 
government that took hold in the middle of the 1920s and followed with a period of calm 
and relative prosperity. As a requisite, government spending had to be curbed since its 
“budgetary deficits had been the immediate cause of inflation.”87 In addition to 
stabilizing the economy by eliminating inflation, stabilization came in the form of 
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currency reform---a significant feature of how the German economy has worked in the 
20th century with some relevance for the contemporary issue as well. The creation of the 
Rentenmark in October 15, 1923 attempted to serve that purpose in order to establish 
confidence in German currency. Indeed, the Rentenmark reintroduced German 
confidence by diminishing inflation, but its purpose was a part of a long-term plan to 
establish the Reichsmark. Where the Rentenmark’s “value was set at one gold or prewar 
mark, and at 4.20 to the dollar or at one trillion paper marks on 15 November,” 88 the new 
Reichsmark was “Equal in value to the Retenmark…had to be 40 percent backed by gold 
or foreign exchange, and the rest covered by commercial bills of exchange.”89  
The middle years of the Weimar Republic encountered success from the 
advancements made by the Dawes Plan as well as the boom in the Atlantic economy. 
Additional reforms, aside from those in government expenditure, developed from the 
restructuring of the marketplace and also contributed to Germany’s recovery. The 
standard of living in the Republic rose, and “National income rose throughout the second 
half of the 1920s, and by 1928/29 the country was at or above 1913 levels of production 
and general welfare.”90 This German success can be attributed to the difficult, but 
necessary, shift in market economic policy and structure via modernization, efficiency 
and consumer goods as well as restructuring among the producing industry, i.e., steel. 
With the creation of a German wartime economy driven by the Great War, an artificial 
market determined the means of production and what products were deemed necessary by 
the government. To continue a war driven economy was not acceptable nor a viable 
solution since it required a government willing to invest in artificial market spaces 
attached to unreasonable prices.  
So that the German market could be reoriented to meet the demands of a non-
wartime Germany, the market economy reconfigured its structure and mindset from one 
of “technical rationalization” to “economic rationalization,” with a strong American 
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accent.91 Instead of attempting to fuel a bustling war economy, Germany had to pursue 
what made economic sense in a peacetime world. Large factories structured to produce 
fighting-goods no longer served the purpose of consumer goods in a civilian marketplace. 
Inherent problems resided in Germany’s pursuit of economic rationalization, but were 
deemed as acceptable risks. Mainly, German economists viewed a shift in attention 
would bring about over modernization.92 From 1924 to 1929, the American accent in 
German economic rationalization took on a liberalized form, but did not divorce itself 
from the unique worker-employer relationship. However, the way in which industry 
employed their workers took a more neoclassical turn. For example, Smith attributed 
three critical elements to the effectiveness of his division of labor theory; dexterity, time, 
and the machinery that allows it to occur.93 Resembling Smith, Ruth Henig explained, 
“Industrial managers reorganised and modernised the means of production in their 
factories in a bid to increase the productivity of workers. Mass production was facilitated 
by a more organised division of labour. The result was a great expansion of output per 
worker.”94 
The theory of German overmodernization conjures up two distinct and separate 
views, or aspects, explained by Karl Polanyi and by Alexander Gerschenkron. If 
Germany became overmodernized, its experience in doing so, as described in Polanyi’s 
The Great Transformation, would be one instance of a double movement. In order to 
meet the needs of the economy central government control must be relaxed, but because 
measures of protection would decline and technology would advance quicker than the 
worker’s ability to master it in a timely fashion a natural opposition force would ensue in 
what was and still is a somewhat conservative society and economy. Gershenkron’s 
theory of leapfrogging could be applied to this era in that during the period of World War 
I Germany focused on war infrastructure instead of societal-economic maintenance. 
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Therefore, following the war, the Weimar Republic’s market reorientation allowed for 
this leapfrogging to occur. Since the war machine of Germany dismissed much of the 
market’s needs as its primary focus rested on supplying the war effort, the Weimar 
Republic became technologically backwards. But, Gerschenkron would argue this could 
be considered a possible advantage, and that Germany could capture the innovative talent 
flooding across its borders from the United States in the form of scientific and 
technological expertise.95 This process of rationalization with U.S. origins became known 
as Americanization, or Taylorism (F.W. Taylor, inventor of scientific management), of 
the production line and rigorous management by efficiency could be seen. Once captured, 
Germany could reverse-engineer products or, better yet, makes advancements upon 
established productions. Moreover, actors in the international market, such the United 
States, had a motivation in the advancement of the German market and “The paramount 
lesson of the twentieth century is that the problems of backward nations are not 
exclusively their own. They are just as much problems of the advanced countries.”96 The 
Dawes Plan fostered this tendency with a closer bond between the two countries for 
better or worse. Improvements in the 1920s certainly seemed at the time to be a fine 
alternative to the over-arching dislocation of the immediate postwar years. 
As rationalization set in as an economic reality, it became twinned with an 
emphasis on cost effectiveness toward the goals of scientific management and getting 
more value out of labor. Cost effective solutions did not always emanate from 
government, and, in fact, the phenomenon of cartelization proliferated—that is, the 
division of the market between leading industries, the most famous of which was the I.G. 
Farben, and another was the Auto Union. Americanization coupled with cartelization 
created a unique set of dimensions in the German economy and emphasized the growing 
tensions between society and the market. Cartelization formed in the face of the attempts 
made toward increased market competitiveness, but served the purpose of keeping prices 
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low.97 Along with growth in cartelization, the German government leveraged more power 
in German banking and market reforms, which provided it a vetoing seat at the decision 
table with “producers, traders, union representatives and independent experts.”98 The 
steel and chemical industries experienced a particular proliferation in small and medium 
sized cartels, which laid the foundation for national and international agreements.99  
In the Weimar Republic, labor interacted with its management counterparts in far 
different ways than in previous years in Germany. Ham quipped, “[the laborer] became, 
indeed, one of the chief pillars of the democratic state.”100 Writing directly after Nazi 
takeover, Ham despaired as he witnessed what he viewed as the most revolutionary labor 
movement being abolished under totalitarian rule. Moving from solely backing the 
employer to backing both employer and worker, the Weimar Republic came to a more 
robust and fuller understanding of labor-management dynamics.101 The growth of unions 
increased and workers found themselves beneficiaries of “the recognition of the unions 
and of collective bargaining, the acceptance of joint arbitration boards and employment 
exchanges, and the granting of the eight-hour day and of the right of workers to be 
consulted in all matters affecting their interests.”102 Of course, these newly acquired 
advantages were borne from the government’s appeasement and fear of a Soviet-styled 
revolution, but ought not to be forgotten. The Weimar Republic’s Constitution’s Article 
165 put laborers as equals to their management counterparts in the negotiation of “wage 
and working conditions, and in the direction of industry.”103 The personal and 
organizational relationships during the Weimar Republic’s years in control were 
unparalleled in the past and advanced the laborer’s position for the future.  
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Despite the advances made in cooperation between government, industry, and 
labor, the issues of reparations and methods of payments endured. The fact remained that 
“Germany was not really earning her reparation payments, which was contrary to the 
spirit, though not the letter, of the Dawes Plan.”104 Germany faced a conundrum in 
attempting to modernize through plans of rationalization while paying its reparation 
payments as set out in the Dawes Plan.105 Modernization was expensive, but necessary to 
remain globally competitive.  
To outsiders, such as those profiting, the successes of the Dawes Plan called for 
an upping of the potential returns. Although with little regard for the current German 
economic woes, the Young Plan of 1930 placed a definitive end date to reparation 
payments, in 1988, and a solid German debt of RM 37 billion.106 The Young Plan set a 
concrete timetable and a payment cap, but the “[payments] were well above what 
Germans thought they could afford and had hoped to pay.”107 Between the Dawes and 
Young Plans, the achievements each plan attempted to gain symbolized differences in 
American and German opinion in the paying of reparations. The Young Plan was 
abandoned and the Great Depression was the new international reality. At a time of 
typical bust following a period of boom, “government policy and Germany’s monetary 
weakness combined to deliver the fatal hammer blows that made this depression worse 
than any previous capitalist experience.”108 
C. THE GREAT DEPRESSION—THE THIRD TRIMESTER 1929–1933. 
Coupled with the natural ebbing of a relative period of boom in Germany that 
began in 1928 and stumbled into disaster after October 1929, “The breakdown of the 
international financial system in the 1930s made a major contribution in turning local 
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depressions into a prolonged world-wide depression.”109 With its massive worldwide 
exporting power as well as its role as international creditor and especially sponsor of the 
German economy with the Dawes Plan, the United States bore most of the blame as well 
as the catalyst to other nation’s periods of depression. In Germany, the depression 
generated fateful and finally fatal effects on the government and the German market. 
Also, the borrowing that occurred only a few years prior to the onset of depression 
exacerbated the problem even further. In 1930, it was not just war reparations that 
Germany found troubling, but now loans in the form of stimulus were difficult to pay 
back. The boom in the United States prior to the period of bust included enormous 
amounts of investment in American funds versus in German investments.110 The Weimar 
Republic’s political and economic infrastructure could not accommodate the exogenous 
shocks generated by the failing market on Wall Street. 
Hardach correctly believes that the United States and thus Germany received the 
heaviest blows from the Great Depression. With the Weimar Republic’s dependence on 
American investment, the two markets interlinked themselves to such an extent that 
untangling the two became impossible without catastrophe. To ease the pain in Europe, 
President Edgar Hoover issued a moratorium for German war reparations, a move that 
was sure to irritate others. The Hoover Moratorium received ample criticism, especially 
from France, but it “became too late to stem the tide, and on 13 July [1931] the Danat 
Bank, one of the biggest German banks, declared its insolvency.”111 It became essential 
for government bailouts, followed by government majority shareholding, to take place so 
that the German economy could continue to function. With little capital and credit, 
German banks decreased their lending frequency to industry by half.112 
The suffering experienced by all in the decade previously formed much of popular 
and government opinion on how the depression should be handled. The fear of inflation 
was real and still in recent German memory, and the printing of money to handle a lack 
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of capital no longer met the expectations of the general population. In sum, Germans 
feared a markup of prices and could not endure another marketplace that required 
wheelbarrows full of currency to buy household goods. Therefore, in order to curb fears 
of inflation, the Brüning government pursued a deflationary policy. Yet, in combination 
with the Great Depression, the market’s downward spiral was too heavy for the 
government to correct. Again, reparations hastened the problem and resulted in increased 
taxes throughout the German population.113  
In what could be considered an endogenous shock, the Brüning government 
resorted to what many economists recommended a liberalization of the market.114 
Brüning’s methods dealt a blow to labor, and represented an undoing of the labor-friendly 
social market principles that had been emerging in the Weimar era. In a time of unease, 
Brüning contradicted the ideals that Keynes fostered and disintegrated elements of 
confidence within the German market. Acting on the belief, “that in advocating 
inflationary techniques he was undermining any kind of reasonable financial policy for 
Germany,”115 Bruning pursued a deflationary policy that “cut unemployment benefits, 
government salaries and veterans’ benefits. In so doing, he weakened the popularity of 
the Weimar Republic and paved the way for Hitler’s rise to power.”116 The results came 
as massive blows to wages and rents, which resulted “in a corresponding reduction of 
consumer demand.”117 Abroad, demand for German goods dissipated while the 
depression continued to affect foreign countries.118 With few German goods purchased 
domestically and abroad, unemployment increased and Chancellor Brüning found himself 
out of office.  
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D. CONFIDENCE RESTORED BY THE NAZIS AND THE COST OF WAR  
The Weimar Republic represented a little over a decade of economic progress in 
the form of labor and industry relations, as well as the progression of social market 
policies. After the fall of the Weimar Republic in 1933, the Nazi government reoriented 
the role of capitalism in different terms from its predecessors. The Nazi form of 
capitalism involved the eradication of labor unions and the subjugation of industry to the 
needs of the total Nazi state, which embarked, at first on a series of work creation 
projects, such as motorways, followed, in turn, by a break neck program of rearmament. 
Thus, the way in which the Nazis used the market benefitted the state’s successful 
trajectory toward war, and certainly not the growth of small and medium sized businesses 
coupled with the protection of labor rights. The Nazi program was directed against the 
world economy, especially against the English speaking world, whose domination of the 
economy in their anti-Liberal and anti-Western minds was also a work of a conspiracy of 
enemies of the regime, especially Jewish bankers and those who the Nazis perceived as 
the real authors of misery in the world. These racist ideas formed the basis for a 
reordering of state and economy, in which the victimization and plunder of Jewish 
businesses was a notable feature of Nazi economics. This mindset continued with the 
epoch of conquest and war so that it expanded on a continental scale. This system of state 
capitalism and the rise of the Schutzstaffel (SS), becoming itself a criminal industrial 
empire on its own in league with private industry, signifies an important feature of the 
Nazi economy.  
The motor industry, with its American prototype, especially profited from Nazi 
policy, where auto ownership and road building were features of prosperity as well as 
reorganization of the motor industry on more or less the pattern of rationalization and 
modernization, but with Nazi military and social goals in mind. Consumer goods were 
downplayed on the U.S. pattern, as wages and prices were controlled. The hard currency 
problem connected with Nazi economy policy led to the Four Year Plan in 1936, and a 
series of bilateral agreements whereby the Germans extracted themselves from the 
structure of world trade, and began barters with south eastern and eastern European 
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nations, i.e., Romania and Hungary, a series of measures that were the prelude to 
conquest.  
In 1948, Newman explained, “Under the Nazi economy all industry was divided 
into either Fachgruppen (functional trade groups) or Wirtschaftsgruppen (economic 
groups) under the minister of Economics.”119 Where once cartels had strong leverage in 
the negotiating power of price and wage, the Nazi government slowly did away with their 
influence in such matters via the reordering sketched out above. Instead of functioning as 
a separate entity from government, the reality was that “So long as the Nazi government 
could make use of the traditional cartel structure, it was permitted to exist.”120 In essence, 
with the dissolving in 90 percent of pre-Nazi cartels, the true motivation of the Hitler 
government revealed itself—the Nazi total government would decide what is beneficial 
to the state and society by its lights, rather than leaving these outcomes to a liberalized 
market.121  
Under the Nazi government at the center of attention was the people’s 
community, and certainly not individual interests or the market as an end in itself as part 
of a reviled world economy.122 The requirement to feed the population under the new 
government was possible through the exploitation of small businesses and the expansion 
of German-governed land. Of great economic importance was the Nazi shift in focus 
from exports to self-sufficiency.123 As the government looked inward, Hitler ensured that 
German wages and employment increased. Whether created from past chancellor’s 
policies or not, the German population’s confidence in government took an upswing as 
well.124  
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The Nazi regime placed a premium on secrecy “since some of the countercyclical 
measures also benefited the country’s military potential, thus killing two birds with one 
stone.”125 Of greatest secrecy prior to 1935 was the rearmament of the German military. 
Hitler reversed Germany’s adherence to the Versailles Treaty, and beginning in 1935 
military expenditure increased with a sum of 60 billion RM by the start of World War 
II.126 If confidence allowed for the success of Nazi inflation policy, then military 
rearmament was made possible through gradual shift from a social market economy to 
one under government central control.127 Yet the Nazi’s altered the German economic 
system toward something new that resembled neither a liberalized market nor a 
communist system, and did so by keeping businessmen in positions of authority, with 
sharp restrictions, to keep competition alive.128 
The war effort required minor and major changes in policy by the German 
government. As the need for men on the frontlines rose, their presence in the factory or 
field at home disappeared. Therefore, the elderly population and women, given waivers 
in the past, found themselves at work, and working hours increased as well. The 
country’s industrial profile also changed—led by the armaments industry’s rise in labor 
“by 28 percent between December 1941 and June 1944.”129  
Nevertheless, the Allies’ air offensive against the Reich took a toll on the capacity 
of German economic output. Transportation, such as railways, and factories endured 
heavy damages, and “about one-seventh of German industrial capacity had already been 
occupied by the advancing Russian army.130 German economic infrastructure was 
beyond Nazi repair, but more importantly the German worker was left without work and 
little more at home. After six years of total war, the Nazis proved that Joseph Goebbels 
was correct that “if the Nazis left the stage in defeat, they would know how to slam the 
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door behind them.”131 Among those economic resources destroyed from the war were 
housing structures, factories, lines of transportation, and a foundation for a functioning 
and successful German social market. Reform would be necessary, but would not come 
immediately and the Marshall Plan would be the first band-aid on Germany’s wounds. In 
addition, the victors of World War II would find it easier to implant their methods and 
ideals in the German marketplace.  
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IV. POST WORLD WAR II: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 
The years directly after the Second World War proved to be a critical time in 
Germany’s socio-political and economic history. Unlike the end of World War I, the 
Allies eventually abandoned a punitive economic peace in favor of common sense, and 
after a period of inaction West Germany received the infrastructural aid it needed and 
ought to have received the first time. This era as a whole witnessed Germany moving 
through several dramatic stages—first, a country in dire need and underdoing 
reconstruction, then a global economic power enjoying prosperity and struggling with 
stagnation, and ultimately reunification. This complex trajectory was embedded with 
events that represented the natural push and pull between the government, industry, and 
laborers with the German economic social market. This period was influenced by the two 
bouts with hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic and the proceeding Nazi regime’s 
method of governance, which understandably shaped the layers of protection afforded to 
the German worker. Furthermore, the post war period up to the reunification of East and 
West Germany is the proper foundation through which to understand the German position 
in the Euro area’s economic crisis of 2007. Also,  
The years following the Second World War gave birth to West Germany’s social 
market economy as well as the ‘German miracle.’ The social market set the standard for 
how the German economy would operate, and the German miracle described the 
relatively quick success Germany enjoyed. Unfortunately, despite a strong industrial 
base, West German growth was delivered a blow with the old Nazi system set in place. 
Kerber and Hartig explained the problem was “the restrictive institutional framework for 
economic transactions which was the heritage of the centrally administered Nazi 
economy.”132 Simply, the artificial restrictions—wages, rationing of goods, set prices—
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put in place by the Nazis continued to affect the German market and its ability to 
grow.133  
The Americans controlled much of West German economic thought directly 
preceding the war, and this influence—combined with the United States’ growing distrust 
of communist Soviet Union to the east—emboldened a strong push toward a neo-liberal 
market system in the immediate postwar period. The West German political canvas was 
divided between the Social Democrats (SDP), who wanted nationalization, and 
“represent[ed] mostly workers and about one third of the total electorate;”134 and the 
Christian Democrats (CDU), who sought a liberalized agenda.135 Although a liberalized 
market appealed to many German policy makers, the complete ridding of government 
control was not the aim. Despite the economic mayhem produced by the Nazi 
government, complete adherence to a self-regulated market did not appear sufficient to 
propel the German market in a desirable direction. War torn Germany sought an effective 
and successful market, but in 1947 the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) “members 
were convinced that private capitalism had failed and that the nationalization of key 
economic sectors would be more conducive to general welfare.”136 Specifically, the 
CDU, “in their Ahlen Program of February 1947…advocate[d] public ownership of 
‘enterprises of monopoly character,’ particularly in the coal and iron industries.”137 This 
particular point of view was born from experiences of economic depression and previous 
failures in economics driven by price mechanisms with little to no government 
intervention. The debate of whether a strict liberal economic interpretation or one based 
on the social agenda ensued, but first Germany and Europe-wide reconstruction had to be 
addressed.  
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A. THE MORGENTHAU PLAN AND THE MARSHALL PLAN 
The Allies divided up post World War II Germany between the four victors—the 
United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—with the goal of keeping 
Germany “decapitated and quartered for the time being.”138 Yet, the regressions made 
after the Great War could not occur again, although attempts to do just that occurred 
through plans such as the Morgenthau Plan. The plan set the standard of living in 
Germany back to the levels of 1932, and then set the industrial agenda to match those 
needs.139 The Morgenthau Plan called for mass de-industrialization of Germany, and if 
pursued to its fullest extent could have devastated Germany’s industrial base. 
Morgenthau-ism halted, and when “the capacity of the steel industry in the Western zones 
had been reduced by 6.7 million tons, the three Western Allies, in order to enhance the 
prestige of the government of newly established Federal Republic, exempted 17 more 
plants from further dismantling.”140 After four years of overlap with the Marshall Plan, 
de-industrialization ceased.141 
The creation of the Marshall Plan in 1947, by United States Secretary of State 
George Marshall, “was an attempt to link aid to the reform of European institutions and 
practices.”142 The plan achieved this aim by, first, asking the European countries how 
they would benefit from aid best and, second, by ensuring sustained growth through 
economic and political stabilization.143 In many ways the Marshall Plan laid the 
foundation for many of the core tenets found in the European Monetary Union. 
Specifically, the Marshall Plan “sought to organize European institutions with the power 
to transcend sovereignties and coordinate policies so that normal market forces could 
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operate.”144 Marshall’s plan intended to create an environment whereby Europeans 
appeared in control of their future with aid from the United States. Skeptics posited that 
the United States created a system that encouraged only one path to success that was 
heavy with American influence. The United States focused on “rebuild[ing] West 
Germany in a way that would not pose a threat to France and other neighbors.”145 
Whether the motive of the Marshall Plan was to prop up European economics versus 
hinder the growth of Communism in Europe, or both, is debatable, but the plan was a 
success with a caveat. Simply, Europe’s economic history placed emphasis on the market 
and entrepreneurship, which created an apt environment for the Marshall Plan to deliver 
large sums of money and find success.146 
B. WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM OF THE 
1950S 
The continued presence of past Nazi economic policies was not only harmful but 
also necessitated effective reform so that Germany could restore its market economy. 
Unlike the policies of Nazi Germany, Western German reforms pulled away from central 
planning and focused on the re-liberalization of its market, which required price controls 
to be lifted.147 Currency reform created the Deutschmark and the market economy could 
pursue a system of price rather than barter.148 To follow, tax reform and a ban on 
cartelization “enunciated a clear commitment to a market economy and the beginning of 
a broad program of liberalization.”149 
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1. Decartelization Policies 
The American ideal for the liberalization of the market economy met ample 
criticism, and did not necessarily represent the West German method to reconstruction 
within its economic borders. Specifically, the issue of cartelization received divided 
attention. Internally, Germans “wanted to refurbish the national economy in accordance 
with the ‘German tradition,’ which in no way saw cartels and other forms of market 
agreements as inimical to the national economy.”150 The United States envisioned a 
method in different terms based upon liberal economic policies that based market 
relationships upon the price mechanism and liberalized interactions. Cartels fueled 
artificial relationships that introduced market distortions, and presented a clear barrier to 
true economic prosperity as viewed by the Americans. In terms of decartelization as 
mandated by the Allies, specifically the United States and the United Kingdom, laws 
brought forth in 1947 “aimed at preventing the misuse of economic power and the 
collusion of a few enterprises which were detrimental to the consumer.”151  
In true Polanyi-form, the decartelization of Germany garnered strong positive and 
negative reactions. One the one hand, Germans viewed decartelization as un-German and 
destructive to their form of capitalization, and on the other hand the United States and 
supporters determined German policy maker’s lack of expediency to legislate 
comprehensive cartel laws as unproductive. Typical of the push and pull found in 
government, citizens, international pressures, and “Domestic constraints induced the 
Americans and the West German pro-cartel industrialists to make a compromise with 
each other.”152 After nearly a decade of continued Allied rule on decartelization and 
many attempts to pass such laws in West German Parliament, the Federal Cartel 
Authority was established in 1957.153 Ultimately, the Economics Minister maintained the 
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ability to deem the need for specific cartels for in certain instances as necessary to 
economic success.154  
2. Laying the Foundation for Economic Success 
German economic success ensued, but the price of converting to the Deutschmark 
was its incompatibility in the international market. The creation of the European 
Payments Union (EPU) helped ease the pain of incompatibility. “Overshadowed by the 
events in Korea,” Henry H. Schloss wrote, the agreement “made further progress in the 
elimination of trade barriers between the member countries of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.), which include[d] practically all of western 
Europe.”155 Moreover, the Korean War provided an increased demand for German 
exported goods to aid the American war effort. 156 The elimination of trade barriers by 
the EPU in Western Europe empowered West Germany to continue liberalization policies 
and further integration into the European and international economic systems. Also, the 
EPU operated to create “convertibility between members on current account.”157 The 
ability of West Germany to cooperate with complete convertibility of the current 
account—the creation of interoperability between one country’s imports versus another’s 
exports—created the true barrier lift necessary for the Deutschmark to continue.  
After initial reforms, growth in West Germany transformed its economy. 
Germany became a production success, and the beginnings of its export-oriented nature 
began to rise in the 1950s. The success of West Germany’s economy was captured in it 
unemployment rates recorded from 1950 to 1958. The unemployment rate in 1950 was a 
staggering 11 percent and fell to a 3.7 percent by 1958.158 Furthermore, the sharp decline 
in jobless citizens in West Germany was “particularly remarkable given that the German 
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labor market had to absorb 9,000,000 refugees from the former German territories.”159 
Germany experienced a shift in paradigm from one of accruing debt to one of issuing 
credit.160 
The internal workings of West Germany in the 1950s revealed the need for more 
workers in an increasingly productive society. So many workers were needed that “By 
1956 Chancellor Adenauer was in Rome, offering free transport to any Italian laborer 
who would make the journey to Germany and seeking official Italian cooperation to 
funnel unemployed southerners across the Alps.”161 Although more in tune with its 
neighbors and ally in the West, the United States, West German capitalism grew to be 
something quite different than the former’s. It was not that West Germany sought an 
unliberalized market economy, but rather that “attention to arrangements aimed at 
preventing or mitigating social conflict, notably between employers and workers” formed 
the foundation for West German economic success.162 The memory of Weimar 
Germany’s economic collapse lingered with both post war West German citizens and 
politicians alike. The memory of not so distant scares of inflation and strikes formed the 
economic policies of the German social market. In turn, the focus on preventing inflation 
and worker strikes created a firm base for economic progress to begin— the strong 
economic policies geared toward protecting the workers and the state encouraged solid 
growth.163 
3. Reform as a Function of West German Economic Success and Decline 
The relative economic success witnessed in West Germany produced substantial 
increases in standards of living for retired and disabled workers. In 1957, pension 
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reformed aimed to secure the standard of living for retired citizens.164 The reform 
intended to equally raise pensions as time advanced so that an equitable standard of living 
could be achieved, and that a retired worker would not be left behind economically. The 
labor force achieved reforms in disability policy as well. As long as a worker attempted 
to rehabilitate “through medical or other interventions,” he received permanent disability 
benefits.”165 Disability benefits applied to blue and white-collar workers alike, and 
accounted for a worker’s training in a specific field so that a worker was not forced into 
an ad hoc, or undesirable, occupation.166 
Inevitably, a bust period followed the boom of the ‘economic success,’ and 
certain insurances ensued. For instance, in the strong period of the 1950s and early 1960s, 
West Germany managed to maintain high levels of employment with only 0.7 percent 
without work, but those levels soon decreased.167 As the call for workers declined, and in 
remembrance of the bust period of the Weimar Republic in the 1930s, the German 
government created the Labour Promotion Law in 1969.168 The law sharply resembled 
characteristics of the West German social market since its aim “was to re-integrate the 
worker into the labour market on the basis of standard employment relationship.”169 The 
law harkened back to Polanyi’s ‘double movement,’ because it recognized the dissonance 
between the working environment’s technological advances and the individual employee. 
Simply, if an employee found himself without work, the law recognized that the 
technology merely out-paced the worker, and created an environment that left the worker 
behind.170 
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Lastly, stemming from the inherent dangerous environment created in the 
shipbuilding industry, the West German government made employers grant sickness 
insurance.171 The law required “employers to pay 100 per cent of a worker’s prior 
earnings during the first six weeks of his sickness.”172 Again, this law aimed to guarantee 
the standard of living that the worker deserved while he could not work. In sum, the laws 
created in the early years of the West German social market protected workers in ways 
not previously envisioned. Certainly, a premium was placed on workers that highlighted 
the growing importance of labor in its relationship with industry and government. 
C. EARLY GERMAN ECONOMIC SUCCESS FOLLOWED BY RECESSION 
In contrast to the German growth of 0.4 percent per year found in the years 
between 1913–1950, West Germany experienced 6.5 percent in the 1950s.173 Western 
Europe experienced increased prosperity in the 1950s as a result of increased 
international trade and interconnectedness not previously found on such a level. In the 
1950s Germany increased its dependence upon its exports and witnessed an increase from 
“7.3 percent in 1950 to 19.3 percent just 10 years later.”174 With success came policies of 
protection geared toward the Mittelstand. Deemed the livelihood of the German social 
market economy, the Mittelstand represented the core building blocks of economic and 
social success. In order to protect this grouping of businesses, “Cheap public credits and 
tax privileges were extended to finance the establishment of new small and medium sized 
firms.”175 During Germany’s time of economic boom in the 1950s, critics claim, fiscal 
policy did not promote a strong liberalized agenda that could have propelled the 
country’s success further.  
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In the late 1950s and early 1960s, West German productivity declined.176 
Economic liberals sought an independent Central Bank (Bundesbank), but politicians 
were staunch in their support of a bank that pursued monetary stability.177 Essentially, the 
economic boom could not be exploited to its full potential, and the 1960s incurred a 
declining economic situation. The West German modus operandi to pursue high levels of 
exports garnered international attention and speculation. Created in 1963, the Council of 
Economic Experts recommended “the introduction of flexible exchange rates to stop 
imported inflation.”178 The speculation mounted from a declining United States dollar, 
and increased government intervention appeared necessary.179 Having reached its 
business cycle peak by 1963, international demand decreased and the need to constrict 
federal expenditure increased.180 Although relatively minor, this West German boom and 
bust period formed much of West German economic policy in the following decades. 
Finally appreciating the effects of over-expenditure, government financed programs met 
their end.181 
Streeck agreed that “From the mid-1970s on, the postwar interventionist state of 
Germany was under strong and apparently irresistible pressures for fiscal overextension 
which emanated mainly from rapidly rising spending on social security, including active 
and passive labor market policy.”182 The final years of the 1960s set the stage for 
Streeck’s prognosis. Modeled after Keynesian economics and strong government 
intervention, the well-known Minister of Economics Karl Schiller insisted upon the 
interlinking of federal and municipal budgets. His initiative aimed to determine, in 
advance, cyclical periods that would necessitate government intervention.183 In order to 
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achieve this end, “A council for anticyclical policy (Konjunkturrat) was established 
consisting of representatives of the Federal, state and municipal governments and of the 
Bundesbank.184 Schiller “did not believe in complete competition,” and wanted a 
distinction between macro and micro decision processes.185 The macro level managed the 
“aggregates like investment, income or consumption.”186 On the micro level, Schiller 
intended for it to manage the price mechanism so that competition remained intact—thus 
forming the unique blend of government intervention in a competitive market found in 
the West German social market.187 
Schiller faced a fluid period in the 1970s, marked by exogenous causes of 
inflation from the oil shock of 1973. Schiller’s creation of macro-economic control by the 
state proved unreliable due to the government’s inability to accurately predict trends. 
After an initial period of boom, trouble lurked. The government’s action to curb inflation 
produced a counterproductive outcome, and “The German Central Bank was in a 
dilemma: in order to fight inflation the interest rate had to be kept high. This, however, 
attracted foreign exchange inflows.”188 Furthermore, after battling unemployment and 
inflation, Schiller was replaced by Helmut Schmidt in 1972.189  Schmidt attempted to 
take charge of the situation through restrictive policies and monetary stabilization.190 
Unknowingly, the policies set forth by Kohl only exacerbated the declining economy, and 
“procyclical public expenditure, high wage settlements first in public sector, then in 
private sector, a restrictive monetary policy and the government’s hesitation to revalue 
the Deutsche Mark because of export interests,” appeared to be the culprits.191 For 
business, this meant that wages and raw materials were too high for them to proceed and 
remain competitive, which was in part due to the “oil crises in 1973 and 1979 [that] 
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brought about an additional rise in production costs.192 The dilemma resulted in a 
downswing of the economy. 
The economic policies of the late 1970s reversed the anticyclical policies created 
in the early part of the decade. To stop unemployment, the German government 
reevaluated its policy and created mechanisms to promote investment. Therefore, for 
private investment to occur, and the ensuing hiring of employees, taxes and interest rates 
associated had to be lowered. This particular time in German economics was not entirely 
unique and similar policies of liberalization could be found in other Western countries, 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom with President Ronald Reagan and 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Nevertheless, international occurrences warranted 
another look at anticyclical policy, but not in the explicit terms created a decade earlier. 
With a strong dollar that created high prices on imports and high interest rates, “The 
Federal government pursued a policy of budget consolidation.”193  
On the flip side from this push toward more liberal markets and economic 
policies, in 1976, the West German worker enjoyed a seat at the table through political 
reform, and earned “parity of representation with shareholders on the supervisory boards 
of large companies.”194 Although workers earned an added say, 1979 through the early 
1980s unemployment spiked in 1982 at two million.195 Perhaps a more severe sign of 
West German economic woe, West Germany regressed in its export power.196 
‘Operation 82’ formed much of West German economic policy in the early 1980s. 
The reform cut many benefits allotted to family allowances and employment benefits. 
‘Operation 82’ certainly removed the individual in West German society from the strong 
benefits it once enjoyed in order to correct government over-expenditure. After a 
Christian Democrat and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition formed, policy of 
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liberalization followed aimed at enhancing economic growth. The goal of the coalition 
government was to create labor market flexibility by breaking down the barriers put in 
place by strong government programs.197 Helmut Kohl came to the West German 
Chancellorship as a result of the change in parliamentary makeup. The general thought 
during the 1980s in German government became a turn away from Keynesian economics, 
and was evident in the FDP, “which favoured even more far-reaching cuts in government 
expenditure.”198 Kerber and Hartig argued that, “By extending the thick net of labor 
regulations in the 60s and 70s, German labor markets lost much of their flexibility,” in 
later years.199 Simply, the strict regulations previously put in place inhibited the West 
German social market from taking strides toward large-scale success. Arguably and 
admittedly without volatility, it is because of these restrictions that the West German 
labor market can continue to function within relative predictive bounds. The West 
German economy in the 1980s embodied liberalized reform and achieved modest 
economic growth of 1.9 on average throughout the decade, but failed to account for the 
diverse nature of unemployment. 
The period of German unification, once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, introduced a 
new set of problems that were perhaps conceptualized but never practiced in past 
economic struggles. The economic differences between East and West Germany were 
vast and particularly interesting due to the extreme proximity in the two contrasting 
systems. When the Soviet Union relinquished control of East Germany, and Chancellor 
Kohl found himself in charge of a larger nation, the West German government had to 
integrate a similar people with a wholly different socio-economic mindset. Although 
West Germany practiced elements of government control, its methods never came close 
to the level of centralized control experienced in East Germany. Another factor to battle 
was the differing currencies, which Kohl ultimately matched in value through the 
creation of the Retenmark and its dissolution. Lastly, and less tangible, was the problem 
of employing a newly introduced society. The problems of unification could have spelled 
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disaster, but did not. Therefore, although this period of time is an essential element of 
German history, its story only highlights the creativity and endurance of the West 
German economic system, and more importantly its ability to absorb an exogenous shock 
that migrated into an endogenous one. The years that followed unification provide an 
essential snapshot of how Germany managed to use its newly acquired resources as well 
as assimilate them into its unique form of capitalism.  
 51
V. GERMANY’S REGIONAL ECONOMIC DOMINANCE AND 
ITS ROLE IN THE EURO AREA  
As early as 1996 discussions surrounding unified Germany’s place as a world 
economic powerhouse emerged. Studies revealed that Germany’s export domination 
within the EU grew from the 1970s, through the 1980s, and landed the country at the 
economic center of Europe in the 1990s.200 In sum, the gains Germany accrued during 
this period outweighed its economic partners in most ways, in both absolute and relative 
terms.201 By 1992, Germany doubled its market share of exports to fellow EU members, 
France and Italy, in comparison to statistics from 1958.202 The period leading up to and 
entering the age of the Euro as a currency appeared bright and full of potential. With the 
Cold War over and liberalized trade in new markets made available, growth in the EU 
appeared possible in exponential ways. Certain obstacles had to be overcome, but 
Germany managed to find ways to succeed economically and politically. In fact, Michael 
Mertes attributed the initial success of the EU to Helmut Kohl, proclaiming, “The EMU 
would undoubtedly not exist today—and the eastward enlargement of the EU would 
probably not have been forthcoming—without Kohl’s strong personal commitment.”203 
The commitments made by the signatories of the Maastricht Treaty bound 
together the newly created members of the EU in ways not experienced in modern 
history. The implications of bridging the many ethnic, language, and cultural gaps within 
the European continent contained particular political and economic ramifications. From 
the Maastricht Treaty came the formation of the European Union with the Treaty of the 
European Union, this bound the members together in matters of community and security 
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policy.204 The EU set the stage for the European Monetary Union to take form and unite 
members in a common market and currency.205 Martin Feldstein wrote, “Its significance 
would not just be the substituting of a single European currency for the individual 
national currencies of the member countries, but that doing so could lead, as many of its 
proponents hope, to a political union that would fundamentally change the politics of 
Europe and of the world.”206 Writing as the common currency was coming to fruition, 
Feldstein reflected upon the socio-political importance of a country’s currency and that 
its existence is the hallmark of a well-established country.207 More importantly, the leap 
from individual sovereign currencies to a single shared European currency contained 
significant psychological ramifications.208 Alternatively, if one remembers the socio-
economic toll of both World Wars, it is easy to agree with Kohl that “the greater political 
cohesion that would follow EMU is the best way to prevent the recurrence of war in 
Europe.”209  
Despite the euphoria of situating the European economic powers in one common 
union, some policy makers and scholars maintained reservations with the perceived 
benefits of the Euro area. In 2008, Kenneth Dyson highlighted three specific risks 
associated with the Euro area. First, is the Euro area in a position capable of fostering 
stability? Second, was the enactment of the Euro area sustainable? Lastly, was the Euro 
area formed in haste, and should it have been implemented at a more suitable time? This 
chapter will make use of Dyson’s questions to establish the German role in the EMU, 
which is enormous within it: “accounting for 27.5 per cent of total Euro Area GDP and 
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37.25 per cent of external trade in good in 2006.”210 Moreover, the case will be made, in 
congruence with Dyson, that the EU’s performance is directly influenced by German 
performance, which today is manifested in Chancellor Merkel’s initiatives. The Euro 
crisis, beginning in 2007, will be the test-bed for this examination since it calls into 
question all three aspects of Dyson’s analysis. 
A. INTRODUCTION TO GERMANY’S ROLE INTO THE EURO CRISIS 
The Euro area crisis has placed a heavy burden upon both weak and strong 
members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This event has revived 
interest in the role that Germany has taken within the European continent, which has 
become increasingly more oriented toward economic growth than military power. 
Germany, with its sound statecraft, essentially orderly finances and merchant state 
mentality adapted to the present has benefited from the epoch since 1990 and the onset of 
globalization, and also more or less from a statecraft that assigns military power a 
subordinate role and in which collective security and collective defense are best 
addressed by what some call “civilian power,” a formulation that embodies contemporary 
ideas about statecraft that reside in society and economy and less so in the products of 
arms makers and generals in general staffs. Germany continues to be considered the 
strongest member of the common Euro currency, and because of this it has great leverage 
among its fellow members.  
If Germany is to be considered the political-economic center of the EMU, the key 
to this role lies in Germany’s economic past and the institutions and practices that have 
grown from this experience. From the rise of the modern German economy in the middle 
of the 19th century with its particular form of capitalism and society, Germans have 
understood money, the market and society in terms far different from the Anglo Saxon 
capitalism found in the United States. Today, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, along 
with the leading members of her cabinet expresses much of what Germany’s economic 
history has taught her. Although Chancellor Merkel places emphasis on competition, her 
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policies carry on social protectionist measures that are at the heart of how the German 
social market economy developed over the course of the 20th century, as described 
above.  
With Europe’s financial crisis, EMU member states have found it difficult to 
strengthen the bonds of the union. Furthermore, the relevance of the overarching 
European Union is at stake as well. Since the presence of the Soviet Union provided the 
impetus for the European countries to create a common market, the lack of Soviet 
presence today provides little reason to proliferate the common market. The continued 
growth and development of the EU, with a common currency, was due to “prosperous 
economic conditions.”211 With the European economic crisis the continuance of the 
common currency and the EU is in question.  
B. THE GERMAN SOCIAL MARKET THROUGH THE EUROPEAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Niall Ferguson quipped, “Is Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, a female 
reincarnation of the ‘deutsche Michel?”212 By this, Ferguson alluded to the scrupulous 
spending habits of the Germans as an effect of the Eurozone crisis. When the Eurozone 
financial crisis hit, Germany was in a far different situation than many of its European 
counterparts. Germany’s Finance Minister Peer Steinbruck was quoted in the 
International Herald Tribune in 2007 having said that, “the German economy has 
weathered the [E]uro’s strength in a remarkable way.”213 France and Germany continue 
to make up the two largest economies of Europe, “with their respective GDP 2009 
standing at euro2,400 billion and euro1,950 billion according to EU statistics, [which] 
represents almost half of the [E]urozone’s GDP of some euro9,000 billion.”214 As early 
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as 2007, the European market witnessed currency issues, but had trouble pinpointing the 
cause. Fingers pointed at an undervalued Yuan in China and the then growing United 
States financial crisis.215 It is possible that these issues contributed to the European crisis, 
but they do not represent the sole cause. Nonetheless, European “concern [was] growing 
that Europe [was] paying the price for problems created elsewhere.”216  
As trouble mounted outside of Europe, EU officials sought measures to protect 
their relatively new common currency market within Europe. Germany stood not as an 
isolated nation, but one with different circumstances that onlookers viewed as 
advantageous. In late 2007 and early 2008 Europeans looked toward the United States 
sub-prime mortgage crisis with disdain, but “around 60% of its exports [were] destined 
for other European about and, within that, more than 40% to the [E]urozone, with only 
10% to the U.S.”217 Simply, with so little enroute to the United States market, Germany 
was setup to circumvent the financial crisis. In fact, officials, to include Peer Steinbrueck, 
believed that an overreaction in the German market was possible, and that the U.S. crisis 
should not be overstated. Moreover, “Steinbrueck said that the impact of the global 
turbulence in the financial markets on the German economy and, therefore, the current 
federal budget had been ‘tolerable’ until now.”218 Although the crisis was not fully 
realized, poor conditions in the housing market loomed and potential buyers found it 
difficult to borrow against their credit.219 It is debatable that the sentiment in Germany, 
during the early months of the financial crisis, was one of disbelief and hubris. Perhaps, 
Steinbrueck was one of the few German officials to recognize the impending financial 
situation in 2008, since he “has managed to bring Germany’s finances under control by 
curbing spending to reduce the budget deficit to less than 3 percent of gross domestic 
                                                 
215 Stephen Castle, “Europeans urge China to change rate policy,” The International Herald Tribune, 
October 10, 2007. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Karina Robinson, “Germany’s Britain-baiting Anglophile – Peer Steinbruck, Germany’s Finance 
Minister, Defends His Country’s Positions – And Cannot Resist A Dig At The UK Leadership.” Interview 
By Karina Robinson,” The Banker, January 1, 2008. 
218 “German minister warns against hysterical reaction to current financial crisis,” BBC Monitoring 
Europe – Political, February 16, 2008. 
219 “Europe still in grips of crisis,” The Advertiser, April 7, 2008. 
 56
product, in line with EU rules.”220 Although the idea of austerity, in line with 
Steinbrueck’s achievements, was not new in Germany, its adherence would become a 
sticking point in future EMU discussions. 
The narrative remained the same from German Finance Minister Steinbrueck that 
the United States was the cause of the worldwide financial crisis. Moreover, the finance 
minister argued, “[Germany’s] banking system is more robust thanks to its large co-
operative and savings bank sectors, which have been barely affected by the widening 
turmoil in trans-Atlantic credit markets.”221 This phenomenon explains the reluctance of 
not only Germany but also France to deny proposed European Union led bailouts. With 
the two leading economies, what were the benefits of supplying German and French 
finances as the bulk of European wide aid? In 2009, “The French, and even more so the 
Germans, [had] been openly sceptical of such a deal from an early stage.”222  
Mr. Steinbrueck appeared skeptical to perform many functions in the European 
financial sector that required governmental influence. In essence, the finance minister 
opposed talks of European Banks implementing artificial remedies to correct any crises. 
His reluctance was evident in his opposition to proposed stress tests that EU banks were 
to impose to gather a better understanding of their banking system’s limits. Steinbrueck 
posited that such a test would create an unnecessary strain upon the financial system that 
could ultimately trigger an artificial crisis. Furthermore, distrust in the banking system 
would grow and future investments would be negatively affected. The overt reluctance to 
meddle in the financial stability of the overall European Union’s economy appeared to be 
a staple in Mr. Steinbrueck’s rhetoric.223 
As the financial crisis took root, in 2010, sentiment in German economic politics 
was one of skepticism in individual failing nations. The EU banking system was suspect 
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as well, but most blame could be found in countries such as Greece. In early 2010 the EU 
wrestled with the idea of implementing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) type 
organization within the EU. In creating such an organization, the EU intended to bail out 
failing countries through a common fund and service supported by the EU. German 
skepticism remained and, German “Spokesman Michael Offer told reporters that a 
European equivalent to the International Monetary Fund, as has been floated in the 
German media, ‘does not appear to be the solution’ to a problem such as that plaguing 
Greece, because it does not get to the ‘root’ of the problem.’”224 
Talks of bailouts took root in 2010 and persist today. At the center of the debate 
was Greece, but other countries such as Cyprus, Spain, and Ireland faced a similar fate. 
The German government, headed by Angela Merkel, continued to express dismay in talks 
of bailouts aimed at ailing EU countries. Instead of accepting bailouts, according to 
Merkel, countries such as Greece must put in place austerity programs.225 Again, the root 
of the problem had to be addressed instead of applying a quick solution. Merkel’s finance 
minister Wolfgang Shaeuble, in 2010, called for similar tactics. A country spending 
beyond its means was not an option in the eyes of German policy makers any longer. The 
debate followed in form with the debate between Hayek and Keynes, whereby the 
German policy makers insisted on decreased levels of spending by government as well as 
little artificial stimulus provided by the EMU. 
With “Germany, Europe’s largest economy, providing the largest chunk of a 
(EURO) 110 billion bailout for Greece,” it was understandable for Merkel’s government 
to oppose bailouts for Greece.226 It should be noted that those countries of the EU that 
operate under a common currency, the Euro, the Stability and Growth Pact was put in 
place to establish rules and guidelines. Whether the Pact is effective is debatable, but 
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critics argue that it “called for heavy fines for violators but the EU never imposed 
them.”227  
The Stability and Growth Pact is made up of two arms, the preventative arm and 
the corrective arm. Guided by the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), “Member 
states outline their medium-term budgetary plans in stability and convergence 
programmes (SCP), which are submitted and assessed annually in the context of 
multilateral fiscal surveillance under the European Semester.”228 While the preventative 
arm is focused on keeping EU members out of fiscal trouble, the corrective arm has the 
authority to impose sanctions and regulations on delinquent members. If a member state 
violates either, or both, guidelines that direct that “deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP 
and public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP (or diminish sufficiently toward the 60%) 
defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU,” the Excessive Debt Procedure 
(EDP) can be enacted.229 With Greece and other countries in violation, Chancellor 
Merkel “wanted bigger legal changes, such as stricter limits on debt and deficits and the 
ultimate threat of kicking a country out of the [E]uro if it can’t stick to the rules.”230 
The Greek example highlighted fundamental flaws in EU policy and regulation. 
In sum, Greece defied the Stability and Growth Pact, and the EU did poorly to enforce 
the regulations found within. In 2009, “Greece’s newly elected Socialist government 
revised the estimate for that year’s budget deficit from 6.7 percent of GDP to a whopping 
12.7 percent of GDP, and then further revised to above 15 percent.”231 A senior fellow at 
the Brooking Institution, Dominico Lombardi, believed the European crisis spiraled from 
Greek negligence. Like Greece, other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and 
Ireland, necessitated bailouts and revised budget plans. The crises of individual states 
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were nothing short of having international implications, especially to those sharing 
borders in the short term. Countries with strong economies, such as France, were affected 
merely because of a shared a border with floundering economies.232 As a result, their 
credit rating declined, which was followed with an increase in bond prices. 
In 2010, as the debate continued on how to handle Greece, Germany implemented 
its own response to deaden the economic crisis within its own borders. Aware of the 
fiscal rules put forth by the Stability and Growth Pact, Angela Merkel decided that, 
“Germany can no longer live beyond its means, insisting ‘we can only spend what we 
take in.’”233 This sort of fiscal conservatism is typical of the pragmatic German nature 
expected after decades of boom and bust periods. As the financial situation worsened, the 
insistence for constraints increased. German calls for European wide austerity measures 
grew, in 2010, as Merkel’s government proposed “sanctions on countries with high 
deficits and advocate[d] the path of austerity as a model for Europe after presenting its 
own package of budget cuts on June 7, worth euro80 billion ($97) by 2014.”234 Although 
France and Germany are the economic giants of the EU, the Sarkozy and Merkel 
governments did not always see eye-to-eye. Although the two governments have not 
appreciated fronting the majority of the bailout stimulus packages, the “French 
government minister in charge of stimulus efforts, Patrick Devedjian…warned that 
German-style austerity measures ‘would be dangerous because it risks killing 
growth.’”235  
As 2010 pressed on, the measures touted by the Germans made their way into the 
European Central Bank. The German-style austerity measures must not be considered 
solely Germanic since the same rhetoric can be found in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Whether in line with Germany or the Pact, “EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli 
Rehn said his proposals will call for member states to be punished early for financial 
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transgressions and insisted sanctions could only be undone by a large majority of member 
states.”236 What Angela Merkel considered negligence by Greece now appeared to be a 
shared sentiment with the European Central Bank, which became a necessary revelation 
in order to form a more cohesive body with similar fiscal understandings. 
Nevertheless, Germany has remained an economic hegemon within the currency 
union, with France in a close second. As the economic crisis continued it became 
necessary for the German leadership to apply their fiscal methods upon the Euro area so 
that unity could be found. In early 2011, Merkel attempted to alter the way in which the 
EU operated. So that future crises could be recognized and remedied earlier, her plan 
“entail[ed] more closely harmonizing their financial, economic, and social policies.”237 
Merkel’s aim was to eliminate surprises by finding a common model that all EU 
members could follow. It is conceivable that as Germany continued to act as the EU’s 
purse that Angela Merkel wanted a larger say in what happens in EU affairs. In 2011, 
“Germans worr[ied] that their trusted Bundesbank [was] being taken over by Club Med 
central bankers who [were] ganging together to soften the euro.”238  
For the European Union members that use the Euro, a common strategy had to 
develop. This is difficult to come by, but options are available and “Potentially, the ECB 
has unlimited financial firepower through its ability to print money. However, Germany 
finds the idea of monetizing debts unappealing, warning that it lets the more profligate 
countries off the hook for their bad practices. In addition, it conjures up bad memories of 
hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s.”239 This emotion is inescapable; and for its 
neighbors to dismiss Germany’s past episodes of inflation is destructive and 
irresponsible. For Germany, the underlying theme continued to be structural change in 
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the EU framework that prevents countries, such as Greece, to engage in poor economic 
practices. Chancellor Merkel’s reluctance toward bailouts and her predilection for 
austerity appeared to work for Germany. By mid-2011, it was reported that Germany 
recovered from the financial crisis and “there are now more jobs in the economy than 
before the crisis.”240 However, with cheers came jeers, and critics worried that 
Germany’s recovery was nothing more than those experienced in France, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.”241 Moreover, even if Germany claimed to have escaped the financial crisis 
it must continue to deal with its weaker partners that suffer from massive debt. 
The high demand for German products and the increase in jobs did not mask the 
long-term implications of the European-wide financial crisis. Germany remained 
reluctant to increase the size of bailouts for its poorer neighbors. It became apparent that 
the financial crisis was not just European or American, it was worldwide, and German 
exports were affected. As much of the international market constricted its imports, 
countries such as Germany, reliant upon their export power, felt the exogenous shock. 
Therefore, if Germany determined the financial crisis to be an existential threat, how 
could it continue to back calls for an increase in European bailout projects? It was 
reported that, “In contrast to France, Berlin has so far ruled out boosting the size of the 
currency union’s bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility.”242 
Nevertheless, the ESFS’s scope was widened in 2011.243 Created in 2010, the EFSF is 
backed by the German Debt Office (DMO), and functions to stem the spread of economic 
contagion through the European countries. Indeed concessions were made, but they have 
left Germany behind the helm—an aspect that fellow members must understand and deal 
with. 
Support grew in 2012 for a more powerful ECB—one that can perform as a 
central body overseeing Europe’s banks. Obvious institutional differences were at play; 
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German Finance Minister Schaeuble rejected the idea of having the ECB control all of 
German banks, and French Finance Minister Moscovici insisted that all European banks 
be placed under the ECB’s control.244 Also an item of contention between France and 
Germany in the financial debate was the use of Eurobonds. Unlike Francois Hollande’s 
government, “Angela Merkel’s government remain[ed] staunchly opposed to the idea of 
jointly issued bonds for the 17-nation [E]urozone.”245 Again, and rightly so, Germany 
continued to press for measures in austerity instead of an increase in debt. It was clear 
that Germany believed that if the ECB continued to buy bonds that it would find itself in 
a financial debacle and unmanageable debt.246 Merkel’s government believed that the 
onus should be on individual states so that the hemorrhaging of Euro area common funds 
could stop.  
After the Fulbright German Studies Seminar 2012, Thomas O. Haakenson 
concluded that the Euro area crisis contained two common themes. He explained that 
they are; “the complexity of decision-making within the EU and the difficulties involved 
in forming a broadly European identity.”247 These two themes bring into question the 
aforementioned problem of who owns the individual banks. One could view the Euro 
banking system as flawed since it relies on a central bank, but requires individual 
sovereign nations to enact policy decisions.248 Haakenson detailed valid reasons for 
Germany’s reluctance to pursue an overt posture in taking the Euro area’s reigns, but too 
little did he recognize the already present German model within the EMU construct. 
Indeed, he reasoned that a history and fear of inflation shape the German financial model, 
but too easily did he dismiss this as reason for German calls for Euro-wide austerity 
measures. Haakenson takes issue more with society than economics, and does so with a 
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strong understanding of German history, but he prescribed a Germany capable of melding 
its character to the broader EU. Conversely, he added that the EU could take on very 
distinctive German features—a result that appears more plausible in the EMU economic 
scheme where Germany continues to find itself in the middle. 
The financial crisis highlighted fundamental differences between sovereign 
nations, such as when “At Germany’s behest the EU treaties were amended in March 
2012 to introduce new fiscal rules for Euro members, known as the ‘fiscal compact.’ 
Among other things, this required all [E]uro members to amend their constitutions to 
install a ‘debt-brake.’”249 Maneuvers such as this have the potential to spread Euro-wide 
skepticism, but it is more probable that they have exposed elements of cooperation and 
innovation between the Euro members. Despite the many instances that the EU appeared 
to be in crisis, it is arguable that “The EU and its members have been trying to do a great 
deal, and they have been more successful than generally realized.”250 Through the years 
of financial crisis, it is clear that Chancellor Merkel consistently desired a strong Euro 
and healthy EU members. Her insistent push for fiscal conservatism has been measures to 
secure not only the Euro currency, but to strengthen the European security bond as 
well.251  
At the time of writing, Ireland has declared that it is out of recession and that it 
plans on removing the austerity measures put in place. Whether this makes Germany 
uneasy or not, the fact remains that the austerity measures backed by Chancellor Merkel 
not only found footing in the Euro area marketplace, but proved to provide an escape 
from financial collapse. The austerity measures followed by Ireland included, “tak[ing] 
€28 billion ($38 billion) out of the economy in spending cuts and tax rises, which 
amounts to 17% of today’s GDP.”252 If Ireland truly exits the bailout it received a mere 
three years ago in 2010, the austerity measures backed by the German government must 
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be taken in and given ample consideration.253 Yet, with that Germany must understand 
that responsible lending in the form of bailouts will continue to be a function of the EMU 
in the foreseeable future. The two methods could be considered a couple rather than 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, the bailouts appear to have a positive influence, however, 
German austerity measures are necessary and the adherence to the Stability and Growth 












German economic practices have arisen from the nation’s political and social past, 
and in fact one makes little sense with the other. Had the Treaty of Versailles not placed 
such a heavy war reparations demand upon Germany, while France annexed much of its 
industrial and raw material power, the Weimar Republic might have prevented two 
instances of hyperinflation. In the post war era, West Germany could look upon the 
Weimar Republic’s double bout with inflation and economic disparity, and thus pursue 
policies driven by measures of protection in order to prevent financial turmoil as the basis 
of political stability and western integration. In addition, such policies coupled with the 
Allies’ propensity to fuel West German economic prosperity through western integration 
in the U.S. led system, promoted rather than ravaged, West Germany’s ability to grow in 
the 1950s. West Germany’s unification with its eastern brethren in 1990 tested its ability 
to handle large-scale shocks as well as its economic structure. The same should be said of  
a united Germany’s place in the European Union’s economic currency partnership 
beginning in the late 1990s. How Germany integrates itself into the common currency 
remains critical to the EU’s success as a common market and more, and how the EU 
handles both exogenous and endogenous shocks could spell out is future. Today, 
Germany continues to exceed its desire to prop up the Euro currency, but its willingness 
to do so persists without clear signs of dissipation. 
Just as a personal experience is interpreted differently by the affected person than 
by an onlooker, the way in which Germans view their economic history differs from that 
of their neighbors and partners from afar. Persons outside Germany with no experience of 
the past routinely cannot discern cause and effect with much clarity. As a case study to 
compare the current Euro area crisis, in Weimar Germany’s time period, the Allies 
viewed war reparations placed on Germany as not only a necessity of policy, but 
something that they deemed would set the record straight and thus made them blind to the 
more profound macroeconomic costs of such a punitive policy based on past experience 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. Germans, on the other hand, understood the demands as 
vengeful, unreasonable, and damaging to markets interconnected with Germany. How 
 66
Germans understand their socio-economic position explains much of Germany’s 
economic history as well as the recent and ongoing Euro area economic crisis. In fact, 
German relations with its floundering Euro partners are indicative of the economic policy 
borne from tacit knowledge that it places upon itself. Simply, the rules that Germany has 
placed on itself domestically are precisely what it expects its fellow partners to adhere to 
as well. 
Moreover, the Weimar Republic’s short life contained particularly interesting 
elements for one to understand the financial crisis that started in 2007. As a historical 
case, for post war Germany to learn from the Weimar Republic made the Allies realize 
that methods of reinvigorating Germany rather than dismantling it ought to be pursued. 
The comparison can be extended to Germany today, but with alterations in the roles 
played in the international political economy. If Germany is compared to the Allies of the 
post-World War II era, comparisons could be made. For instance, the way in which 
Germany today stands as the economic strong back of the Euro is comparable to the 
leverage the Allies had over West Germany after World War II. This point is especially 
the case in how the Allies attempted to pursue their agenda in West Germany—which in 
comparison can be said of Germany in the EU. The United States brought forth the 
Marshall Plan, which set guidelines on how the U.S. would aid the occupied West 
Germany. Today, by contrast, Germany has not successfully put in place all measures of 
austerity that it would like to see in failing states of the EU, but its economic power is felt 
in uncomfortable and disconcerting ways whereby the comparison with the reparations 
question and the post 1945 western and Euro-Atlantic order form a useful point of 
comparison. Although such southern European countries as Greece have received 
bailouts, the terms of such agreements make no sense without an understanding of the 
Protestant Swabian austerity dicta reminiscent of the Bruening government, but which 
also arise greatly because of domestic political imperatives of which Chancellor Merkel 
is deeply aware and can never escape.  
In addition, this paper argues that the German economic experience is unique and 
very different from those of its closest neighbors. Setting the Weimar Republic as the 
historical benchmark, one could progress through German’s history and understand its 
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nuanced nature as well as its social market concept. The Dawes Plan of 1924, and the 
modified Young Plan of 1929, attempted to extract what reparations it could from the 
Weimar Republic through duty free exports to recipients like France and forced German 
policy makers to meet these demands often at the expense of the German public that was 
ever more radicalized. Once economic chaos struck again in 1929–30, the Nazi party and 
its leader Hitler filled the confidence gap that the German people desperately needed with 
an ideal of full employment at whatever cost, with an abandonment of the world 
economy and an eventual policy of German economic hegemony. Although short lived 
and with grand repercussions, the German worker found a job and purpose through 
feeding Hitler’s artificial economic purpose. This span of time witnessed a strong swing 
of the pendulum from the Weimar Republic’s floundering under war reparations and 
economic ambiguity to a strong resurgence in the German government taking ahold of 
their economic position.  
The Third Reich’s collapse left Germany with little economic infrastructure, 
much to be blamed on the Reich as well as the damage done by the Allies. The splitting 
of Germany into two after the war created the interesting dynamic of one side propelled 
by Western capitalist ideals and the other by a structured central government. With 
proper focus on West Germany, the social market’s creation and future found roots in 
Germany’s checkered economic past dating back to the end of the Great War. Fear wrote, 
“The notion of a ‘social market economy’ became central to national stability.”254 The 
concept was more or less unique (shared by the Austrians and Scandinavians), but not 
outlandish when conceptualized in regards to where Germany’s trajectory began and 
followed. In marrying the economic and social needs of its citizens and its pursuit of a 
modified capitalist structure, West Germany found its place in the Western system 
through substantial welfare programs and a propensity for a large savings.255 
Economic prosperity found a home in West Germany early on, but this was not 
the case throughout the entire Cold War. Natural boom and bust periods followed, but it 
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is important to note that the social market economy continued and established itself as the 
norm in Germany’s socio-political-economic construct. The reunification of Germany 
presented the next major hurdle to overcome, which included the melding of two peoples 
with distinctly different economic experiences and the swallowing of an entire country by 
another. Currencies at odds with one another and an enlarged workforce demanded social 
protections to be reinforced and placed on all citizens from the west and east alike. 
Ultimately successful, Chancellor Kohl established a unified Germany capable of 
integrating with the international market, as well as a soon to be common currency within 
the EU.  
A. BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND WHY UNDERSTANDING GERMAN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY MATTERS 
Much is at stake when negotiating the future of the Euro as a currency and of the 
European Union as a common space with core ideals. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, the EU’s ability to manage its currency through financial crisis has 
international implications. The EU’s relations with other countries such as, the United 
States, China, and Russia, are affected by how well the largest currency in Europe 
performs. Therefore, from this perspective, Germany’s role in the EU is of exceptional 
importance. Its export power alone creates stability and performance oriented growth for 
the Euro that many other members cannot claim to do. Germany’s place as one of the big 
five countries, as considered by the EU, makes its stability critical to the success of the 
Union.  
Certainly, Germany has not single-handedly cured the financial crisis that hit the 
Euro area, but its relative economic strength has deadened the pain. In terms of gross 
debt, Germany continues to maintain between 81.1 percent to 81.9 percent since the first 
quarter of 2012.256 This is lower than the Euro area’s gross debt during the same period, 
which maintained between 88.3 percent and 90.7 percent since quarter one of 2012.257 
Since many point their fingers at Greece for perpetuating the sovereign debt crisis, its 
                                                 
256 Eurostatistics Data for Short-term Economic Analysis, Issue Number 05/2013 (Luxembourg: 
Publications of the European Union, 2013), 31. 
257 Ibid., 21. 
 69
numbers are relevant. From the first quarter of 2012, Greece maintained 136.5 percent of 
gross debt and ended 2012 with 156.9 percent.258 Perhaps more telling is the large 
disparity between employment numbers in recent quarters. Greece trends toward higher 
unemployment numbers with a staggering 27.2 percent of its population unemployed in 
the first month of 2013.259 Germany, on the other hand, reported 5.4 percent for the same 
time period, with no more than 0.1 percent variation since May 2012.260 
The Euro area financial crisis prompted policies makers of the EU and individual 
countries to rethink economic policies and how they are able to weather shock. Germany 
was prepared to weather the storm better than other EU members, and its recovery is a 
testament to this. Moreover, members of the common currency should regard Germany’s 
policies as effective. Alternatively, Germany must understand that what worked for its 
country might not spell out the same successes in other countries with wholly different 
socio-economic conditions. Although, the German model does raise the question, and 
perhaps provides the answer, of whether conditions of austerity and manageable debt 
should be policy maker’s priorities. Moreover, one can look to the solidarity that formed 
with the American backing of the Dawes Plan as an analogy to the German backing of 
Euro area led austerity measures and bailouts.   
It is no surprise that Germany, specifically Chancellor Merkel, found it difficult to 
back plans for wide scale bailouts aimed at the failing countries of the common currency. 
The aforementioned unique economic experience of Germany affects its policy makers 
today, and its propensity to follow tried and true methods is apparent. Domestic and 
international shocks alike are not new phenomena for Germany, and the methods put in 
place through its history are learnt from those experiences. This answers why Germans 
act in the manner in which they do; it is the historical hardships endured by their 
ancestors that propel Germans to ask more from their government than in other 
democracies. A unified communist or completely socialist German state never came to 
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fruition. Perhaps because of its ability to produce and manufacture complex and often 
superior goods or from its desire for competition, Germany’s predilection for capitalism 
remained at its roots. More important than its pursuit of capitalism is its drive for social 
protection, which finds its purpose in every corner of its modern history. At the expense 
of its ability to experience volatile market fluctuations is the German method of detail 
and protection of its most important product, its people. For the Euro area, understanding 
German methodology is paramount if the EU wants to look at Germany for financial 
assistance and guidance. 
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